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ABSTRACT  
   
Given the success of science, weak forms of mind-brain dependence are 
commonly treated as uncontroversial within contemporary philosophies of mind. 
More controversial are the different metaphysical claims inferred from this 
dependence, many ascribing ontological priority to the brain. Consider the 
following three propositions: (i) neurological events are essentially identified by 
their role in material systems, laws, and causes that are constitutively non-
rational; (ii) at least some mental events are essentially identified in virtue of their 
role in the use of reason; (iii) all mental events are realized by, identical to, or 
composed out of, neurological events. (i) is uncontroversial. However, (iii) is 
strictly materialistic. (i), (ii) and (iii) taken together appear incoherent. A fruitful 
task for philosophy is to resolve this apparent incoherence. In his 1997 book The 
Last Word Thomas Nagel offers an explication of reason that conceptually 
transcends the nature of material substrate. In his 2010 article "Modest Dualism" 
Tyler Burge offers reasons to think of propositional thought as irreducible to the 
concepts of the material sciences. Both focus on rationality as a unique form of 
intentionality.  Both philosophers also reject materialism (iii). On their accounts 
it's reasonable to take 'rational intentionality' as exhibiting a logical priority of the 
mind with respect to the brain in inquiries into the nature of mind. Granting this, 
the diminished conception of mind presupposed by prevailing contemporary 
theories is seen to be the result of a more general failure to recognize the logical 
priority and intricate nature of rationality. The robust views of rationality 
expressed by Nagel and Burge constitute grounds for argument against even the 
  ii 
weakest form of materialism.  I develop such an argument in this thesis, showing 
that the propositional attitudes exhibited in thought and speech preclude all 
materialistic notions of mind.  Furthermore, I take the nature of propositional 
attitudes to suggest a perspective for exploring the fundamental nature of mind, 
one that focuses not on composition but on rational powers. 
  iii 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Critical Analysis of Traditional Approaches to Argument in the  
Philosophy of Mind 
 In the philosophy of mind two positions stand at polar opposites: 
materialism (or physicalism)
1
 and substance dualism.  Materialism, defined in the 
broadest sense, is the thesis that all substantial forms of being are materially 
composed.  Although use of the term ‘matter’ may be rather ambiguous within the 
material sciences, materialism’s stance unequivocally precludes belief in any 
immaterial substance.  For materialism, all phenomena are de jure explainable as 
necessitated by, or supervening on, matter and its active forces; there is no other 
substance that is ontologically equal in status to matter since all is fundamentally 
matter.  All phenomena, however greatly they differ from their original source, 
are explainable by reference to that original source.  As such, all philosophical 
explanation of mental phenomena must appeal to the material brain and/or its 
surrounding environment.  This position, as will be discussed below, varies in 
breed. 
 However, there are those who do not, or cannot, concede to this position 
due to their commitment to mental phenomena as fundamentally distinct from the 
physical.  Incidentally, these persons differ amongst themselves about the nature 
of mental phenomena and their relation to matter.  Two positions exhibiting this 
                                                 
1
  I will use the term ‘materialism’ in the sense in which it is interchangeable with 
‘physicalism’. 
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latter contention amongst non-materialists are property dualism and substance 
dualism.  Property dualism holds that mental properties are novel states, or events, 
that arise out of the material substance of the brain.  Substance dualism holds that 
the mind is a sui generis substance from the material body, interrelated perhaps, 
but existentially independent.   
Property dualism differs from substance dualism in more than one respect.  
The disagreement is not merely about theoretical inference, but about theoretical 
approach.  Property dualism, like materialism, begins by approaching the inquiry 
into mind beginning with the physical, with emphasis on empirical phenomena.  
Having assumed that there are no immaterial substances or causal powers, all 
hope and burden is placed upon material science to offer evidence for a 
conclusion that is already assumed. 
My general assumption is that a necessary criterion for any theory of mind 
is as follows: if a theory of mind is to be considered a reasonable account of 
mental phenomena, it must initially provide rational warrant for its theoretical 
treatment of mental phenomena by containing all logical features necessary for 
inquiry.  We naturally take ourselves as having the capacity to inquire, and 
furthermore to make objective claims (e.g., “materialism is true”).  It is 
analytically prudent, then, that a broader scope of inquiry into the nature of mind 
begin with inquiry into the nature of that capacity which enables one to inquire.  
That is, philosophical propriety requires that one recognize one’s assumptions 
before going on to make judgments that rely on those assumptions. 
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I will use substance dualism heuristically, attempting to cast doubt on 
those approaches that treat matter as ontologically prior
2
 with respect to the mind.  
Materialism’s theoretical objectivity will be critically evaluated to see whether it 
epistemically obtains rational warrant for the validity of its own claims.  I’d like 
to suggest that substance dualism, as the extreme alternative to materialism, 
challenges and so exposes an unwarranted presupposition commonly implicit in 
philosophical approaches to mind, not to exclude the approach of property 
dualists.   
Substance dualism contrasts such positions in its willingness to begin 
inquiry by taking the mental on its own terms.  As such, the mind is treated as 
logically prior to matter in the inquiry into mind and the relevant phenomena are 
initially evaluated simpliciter without immediate reference to matter.
3
  In this 
way, substance dualism posits an intriguing question: “What approach ought to be 
taken when we inquire into the nature of the mind?”  This question is properly 
basic to all inquiries about mind.  If matter is ontologically prior to mind then 
perhaps one can hope for materialism to be true and find promise for the physical 
sciences to illumine future discussion through empirical discovery.  However, if 
the mind is logically prior, and so ontologically distinct from matter, this will not 
be the case.  Instead, the nature and causal importance of the mental can be 
                                                 
2
 By ‘ontologically prior’ I intend to convey the materialistic notion that all 
mental natures, states, events, and causal features are grounded in, and so 
supervene on, material natures, states, events, or causal powers. 
3
 By ‘logically prior’ I intend to convey that such positions take the mind to be 
approached via the nature and causal features of the mental and not approached 
through reference to physical states, events, or causal features. 
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understood only when inquiry begins by attempting to understand the instantiated 
mental features necessary for inquiry.  By approaching the question in this way, 
arguments for any sort of dualism will find greater foundation in stressing that 
philosophical inquiries into mind cannot justifiably begin with investigations into 
material phenomena; that is, philosophical inquiry must precede empirical 
inquiry.  Proponents of materialism who begin investigation with appeals to 
material phenomena are presupposing what they set out to prove.  Therefore, a 
warranted materialistic methodology cannot precede, and so logically preclude, 
considerations of robust explications of mental capacities and phenomena.  As 
such, a neutral methodology that justly evaluates the weightier concerns of 
dualism requires that robust explications of the mental be treated prior to its 
relations to matter. 
 One’s answer to the question of approach will supervene on what one 
takes to most deeply express the nature of the mental.  There is disagreement 
amongst philosophers of mind about what sort of mental phenomena exhibit the 
deepest wonders of existence; for dualists it is about what sort of phenomena 
exhibit the deepest problem for materialism, and offer the greatest hope for 
dualism.  In this, dualist apologetics is bifurcated.  One approach attempts to 
argue for dualism on the basis of qualia; qualia are those phenomenological 
aspects of consciousness that occur in perceptual experience.  The other position 
attempts to explicate the nature of intentionality as that mental capacity to direct 
ourselves toward something in the world.  Neither approach directly implies the 
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sort of dualism one will believe, though it will have implications for one’s 
reasoning against materialism. 
1.2 Base Intentionality vs. Rational Intentionality 
 The present emphasis will be on approaches from intentionality.  
Intentionality can be described broadly as the aboutness of mental representation.  
The representation of a thing in one’s brain state exhibits the ability to direct 
one’s mind at a thing in the world.  This representation, as is often described, is 
exhibited in basic capacities to perceive and so desire some thing, to direct one’s 
act toward obtaining that thing, and to be satisfied by that thing.  Perhaps this sort 
of representation does constitute a difficulty for materialism.  However, the 
present thesis will not be concerned with this level of intentionality. 
 The work to follow will aim to consider a position that supervenes on a 
distinct, and much stronger, sort of intentionality.  This is the intentionality 
manifest in rationality.  I will call it ‘rational intentionality’.  Such intentionality 
is manifest in our ability to think about something.  This thinking constitutes the 
grounds upon which we grasp concepts, make judgments and form arguments.  
These mental acts are to be contrasted with the more basic acts of intentionality, 
what I’ll call ‘base intentionality’.  Perhaps this contrast can be exhibited with a 
simple introspective consciousness toward the present philosophical topic.  We 
are aiming at a justified belief, or more weakly a warranted truth-claim, regarding 
the nature of the mind.  My desiring (here, a form of base intentionality) that 
materialism or dualism be true is epistemically irrelevant and inconsequential to 
the philosophical truth.  When involved in philosophy, base intentionality is most 
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commonly associated with pseudo-arguments (e.g., appeal to fear, appeal to pity, 
etc.).  As such, it bypasses the objectivity of argument, and offers no 
philosophical contribution to obtaining good reasons for belief.  Philosophical 
inquiry, therefore, presupposes a robust form of intentionality that moves beyond 
the subjective and particular to enable us as humans to attain to the objective and 
universal.  It is the involvement of my rationality that is important; my 
contribution to philosophy is contingent upon my ability to properly represent the 
concepts, judgments and arguments made by others, and furthermore my own 
reasoning -- the concepts I’ve grasped about the subject matter, the judgments 
I’ve formed about what is valid and what is invalid, and the arguments I’ve 
formed to constitute my own warrant for believing what I do -- is what is to 
undergo evaluation.
4
   The following examples reveal the presupposed objectivity 
that is inherent to all thought, whether sophisticated or unsophisticated, theoretical 
or ordinary. 
1.3 The Ineluctable Presupposition of Thought and Its Objectivity 
Science: Newton’s argument for light as wavelength via prism 
 Prior to Newton’s experimentation with light, it was thought that light is 
painted as it passes through a prism.  (Call this the ‘painted-light hypothesis’.)  
Newton recognized that the spectrum of light was most clearly distinguishable 
when a screen is set some distance away from the exit side of the prism.  
                                                 
4
 Perhaps it will be argued that this ‘rational intentionality’ is ejusdem generis to 
that intentionality expressed in desire, manifest by the intricate mental capacities 
evolved through evolutionary development of the brain. This argument is offered 
by John Searle and will be discussed below in section 5, “Materialistic 
Evaluations of Intentionality”. 
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Secondly, he recognized that the painted-light hypothesis could be tested and 
falsified.  The painted-light hypothesis relies on the assumption that there is no 
natural difference between the varying physical elements composing light.  Yet, if 
one particular color (say, green) of the spectrum could be isolated in its exit path 
from the first prism and alone directed through a second prism, the second prism 
should paint this light a different color.  Of course, the prism did not paint the 
light, and it never has done so in any other known subsequent experiment.  The 
second prism indefinitely yields the same color as that isolated after exiting the 
first. 
 Objective and universal categories are necessary for thinking and so are 
necessary for any science.  The explanatory success of Newton’s experiment 
supervenes on his ability to argue according to the nature of things (e.g., prism, 
light, color spectrum observable by human eye).  He must show that this 
occurrence is not reasonably taken as mere happenstance--that the light has not 
merely in coincidence yielded green twice over for each observed instance. 
 To show this Newton displayed a capacity to move from the particular to 
the universal, from the perspectival to the objective.  He judged that the color 
spectrum exuded from a prism is due to inherent variations in light itself (viz. 
wavelength).  This is inference from data to theory—an assumption that all 
phenomena have an objective nature and that the human mind can understand the 
objective nature of a thing by a finite set of observations.  Generally stated, this is 
to objectify and so universalize an interpretive inference grounded in no more 
than one’s subjective experience of a finite number of observations.  It is 
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irrelevant here whether such probabilities constitute knowledge.  It is only 
relevant that we recognize the assumptions behind our doing science, or our 
believing in the claims of science.  We naturally take ourselves as capable of 
objectivity in thought.  This assumption is implicitly held in all science that, from 
a finite number of observations, one has warrant to judge this finite set to be a 
good representation of the objective nature of light and so extend one’s 
interpretation of sensed data to an unqualified statement about what is. 
Mathematics: Euclid’s Proof for infinite sequence of prime numbers 
 The density of prime numbers greatly decreases as one moves toward 
larger integers.  Intuition might easily lead one to the belief that at some point in 
the progressing series of integers prime numbers stop occurring altogether.  
Against intuition, however, Euclid proved on the grounds of mathematical 
reasoning that the series of natural integers contains an infinite sequence of prime 
numbers.  His proof is commonly held as sound and uncontroversial, despite its 
tension with intuition. 
 Plainly stated, Euclid was able to lead the finitude theorist into a dilemma 
in the following way.  Consider the progressing number of natural integers, with 
a1, a2,…an being the known progression of primes.  Let n be the product of all 
known primes.  Consider n!+1. Either n!+1 will be a prime, in which case it will 
be a new prime (n<x), or n!+1 will be divisible by some i.  However, i cannot be 
in the set factoring to n!, for then it would then be a factor of both n! and n!+1, 
and as a factor would be able to divide the difference between n! and n!+1, that is 
1.  However, 1 is only divisible by itself, and it is accounted for within the 
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original set of prime factors.  Therefore, n!+1 is either itself a prime number or 
unveils a new prime number not accounted for in the original factors of n!.  
Furthermore, one is consequently to the certain, conclusive proof that a new prime 
will always await us no matter how far we progress through the indefinite, endless 
scale of integers.  
 Euclid’s use of reason here, though highly technical, is ordinary in at least 
one sense.  In his proof he abstracts fundamental truths from the known series of 
numbers and applies them to get a universally applicable judgment.  He does not 
need to consider every possible number, or appeal to sense experience, to make 
the judgment (as some empiricists might demand with respect to other fields of 
knowledge). He grounds his proof in principles that are necessarily true, and so 
unquestionable, within the system of numbers. 
 The nature of the proof is uniquely uncontroversial because the principles 
(content of its premises) are uncontroversial.  A prime number is incontrovertibly 
ascribed with the property of indivisibility by whole numbers, other than 1 and 
itself (a necessary truth for all numbers).  If one disputes this point, one doesn’t 
understand what is being said, or one is being difficult (not having integrity 
perhaps).  From indivisibility, then, comes the claim that such a number will 
inevitably arise in the progressive sequence in virtue of the known primes.  The 
known primes are used to derive a product n.  The nature of a factor to a product 
is such that it divides the product.  Thus, any factor common to n and n + 1 is able 
to divide it’s difference (1) as well.  However, the only divisor of 1 is 1.  So, there 
can be no prime factor shared by both n and n + 1.  To doubt this would require 
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one to doubt the concept of ‘1’.  In Euclid’s formulation of the argument, and in 
our grasping and evaluating it, the fundamental nature of numbers is made 
explicit. 
 Euclid’s solution is compelling as an objective argument on the basis of 
reason.  If one disagrees, one either does not understand what is being said (ill-
equipped to use reason in this skill) or they doubt the concepts of ‘1’ or of a 
‘prime number’.  If these concepts are conceptually framed in the mind through 
further discussion of philosophical principles and yet one persists in disagreement 
it must be said that there is an unwillingness to use reason with a lack of concern 
for knowledge.  This is the force of mathematics as a realm of thought.  
Mathematics enables one to utilize reason constructively, and to attain to 
universally applicable laws within thought 
Common and Ordinary Argument: The Sun’s finitude   
 The final argument I invoke conveys a strong sense of reason as it relates 
to our everyday thoughts.  Not all are gifted in ways similar to Newton or Euclid.  
Yet, each thinking person makes objective estimations, and furthermore evaluates 
the estimations made by others as either true or false.  Consider a common, 
ordinary claim put into the form of a syllogism: i) IF the sun’s fuel resources are 
limited and it is consuming these limited fuel resources to continue burning, 
THEN the sun will burn out; ii) The sun’s fuel resources are limited and it is 
consuming these limited fuel resources to continue burning; iii) Therefore, the sun 
will burn out.   
  11 
 I am herein primarily concerned with the rational intentionality implicitly 
involved in considering any ordinary claim, and not the veridical status of the 
claim.  What are the presuppositions (perhaps unconsciously held) by a thinking 
agent involved in evaluating a claim about the sun’s fate?  The syllogism may 
strike us as formal, but the reasoning is ordinary.  Judgments like this fill our 
textbooks and our coffee breaks.  In such claims we take ourselves to be capable 
of ascertaining aspects of reality in order to represent them in thought to ourselves 
and in meaningful speech to others.  Most of us take reality as made up of 'mind-
independent external objects' and their relations.  We attempt to understand and so 
relate to this reality, and furthermore attempt to represent this relation to ourselves 
and to one another through thought and speech.
5
  If we are to live as thinking 
beings, we cannot avoid the objectivity of our claims.  If we are to live as thinking 
beings, our epistemological and metaphysical views must be able to consistently 
ground our warrant for believing ourselves to be capable of such statements.   
1.4 Qualifying Objectivity as it Relates to My Position 
 The grounds for my position are ordinary.  I’m not relying on any truth-
claim about objective capacities, but I’m only relying on what I take to be 
uncontroversial: in any thought we do take ourselves to be reasoning agents 
capable of attaining to objective knowledge in our claims.  Any explicit denial of 
                                                 
5
 Being aware of the anti-realist sentiment against such notions, I would point out 
that in all claims we exhibit an ineluctable capacity for objectivity.  One may ask, 
“Is it, or is it, not the case that m is pragmatic for me under conditions (or 
parameters) x, y, and z?”  Under such circumstances, one’s answer to this question 
could be imagined as cut off from matters of objectivity.  Instead, logical 
propriety would require that one see one’s claim as objective, applying to all 
others who seek utility under similar conditions. 
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this capacity implicitly affirms it; any response to the claim I’m presently making 
about the objectivity of all thought, is itself an objective claim.  Our thought, then, 
obliges us to take ourselves to be capable of objectivity in our thought.  
Objectivity in thought is therefore ineluctable.   
 Furthermore, I reject radical skepticism.  This capacity for the objective is 
not illusory but, with integrity, attains to knowledge of the real.  We do have good 
reason to take Newton as attaining to a deeper (although perhaps imperfect) 
knowledge of light, and to take Euclid as discovering an irrefutable truth about 
numbers.  To deny this claim (i.e., that we do in fact attain to the objective) one 
must presuppose it.  This can be seen in the following way.  Any criticism of the 
claim that we attain to knowledge of the objective is a judgment.  A negative 
judgment of this sort displaces the claim by implicitly asserting an alternative 
claim to truth.  In this case, one would displace a claim to knowledge by making a 
claim to knowledge of its contradiction.  This form of skepticism, then, implicitly 
reinforces the claim being explicitly denied.  Its proponents are affirming in 
practice that very capacity they are attempting deny in theory.  This is a self-
refuting skepticism, logically incoherent in virtue of its inherent absurdity. Thus, 
thinking is inextricably linked to objectivity.  The practices of Newton, Euclid and 
the common man are thus upheld in the face of skepticism by virtue of the 
ineluctable nature of objectivity in thought.  To deny the capacity for attaining to 
objective knowledge would be to undermine all thought. 
 What can we infer from this?  As agents we naturally attempt to obtain 
warrant for our beliefs.  One can ask then about the necessary ground for holding 
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warrant with regard to claim-making.  To hold warrant for taking ourselves to be 
properly equipped agents for this task of making claims, we must affirm the 
capacities necessary for the task.  These capacities require a metaphysical ground 
sufficiently equipped with the powers necessary to enable our capacity to make 
claims about the objective, mind-independent external objects that we incorporate 
in thought.  If the link between our thoughts and objectivity was found to be 
unverifiable, epistemic consistency would require that we cease to think.  In 
thinking, we implicitly deny this skepticism and affirm that we have the capacity 
for knowledge. 
Furthermore, in beginning inquiry it’s reasonable to suspend all 
materialistic dispositions and assumptions.  For, to begin inquiry with such would 
be to embrace dogmatism.  Where one attempts to argue for a position, one cannot 
reasonably begin by assuming what can be conceivably questioned by others.  
Clearly, this would be assuming what one is supposed to prove (viz. that matter 
can account for all mental phenomena).  In this way mental phenomena are to be 
initially treated on their own terms.   
Note that an assumption about the explanatory power of matter is not like 
the assumptions involved in Newton’s science.  Newton takes his perception to be 
uniform and so trustworthy.  Furthermore, he takes the nature of the prism to be 
stable, not given to instantaneous co-arising phenomenological qualities that can 
toy with reliability in the experiment.  In fact, his hypothesis is built on a sort of 
inductive reductio wherein he assumes the “painted-light” hypothesis to be true.  
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Conclusively then, we should note that Newton only assumes those features that 
his audience would also assume, and no more.   
In the philosophy of mind the explanatory power of matter is in question.  
Like Newton, proponents of materialism ought to begin with assumptions that 
cannot be questioned—those assumptions that are common to all within the 
discussion.  Only then, will materialism answer the objections adequately.  If the 
terms of the mental are insubstantial, inference to matter’s ontological priority 
will be an easy move.  If the terms of the mental are robust, inference to material 
reduction (i.e., monism) will not be so easy. 
The depth of the mental is exhibited in this: any truth-claim about the 
nature of the mind necessarily presupposes (perhaps unconsciously) those 
principles that ground the objectivity required to make such claims.  It is not 
plausible to suppose that we can fully ground our claims to objectivity in base 
forms of intentionality such as perception and desire.  It follows that any position 
that hopes to show good reasoning for its claims must coherently ground the 
capacity for rational intentionality.  This has consequences for ontology, as I will 
argue below. 
 The extreme position of substance dualism has been used to call into 
question not only the metaphysics of materialism but, more importantly, the 
approach of materialism.  In contrast to beginning inquiry with a presumptive 
emphasis on matter (precisely identified, a petitio principii), one alternative 
approach I’m suggesting attempts to begin inquiry with the mental.  More 
particularly, this approach fundamentally begins with that mental capacity which 
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grounds our ability to inquire. (I assume this approach is reasonable--that we 
inquire about the capacity to inquire before we inquire into other aspects of mind.)  
The result is an emphasis on the need for our claims (as beliefs, or mental acts) to 
be grounded in a metaphysic of the mind that coherently affirms the capacity to 
make such claims. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF NAGEL AND BURGE 
 Thomas Nagel and Tyler Burge hold very influential positions in 
contemporary philosophy of mind.  Curiously, most take each to be interested in 
distinct problems.  Nagel exhibits a concern for problems of qualia and Burge is 
intrigued by problems of intentionality.  I will contend that this approach to 
understanding their contributions is simplistic and that a broader analysis of their 
work unveils their similar concerns about rationality and its vital relation to the 
philosophy of mind. 
 Thomas Nagel’s philosophy of mind is often depicted as being about 
qualia only
6
.  This judgment is simplistic considering Nagel’s book The Last 
Word (1997) in which he offers an intriguing investigation into rationality as a 
human mental phenomenon.  In this work, his reason-focused epistemology is 
counteractive against notions of reason as conventional or personal.  Though 
Nagel’s work is not intended as a work for the philosophy of mind, it’s relevance 
is explicit.  By speaking of reason as natural and impersonal, Nagel speaks of the 
human mind as having access to objectivity and self-attesting authority.  As such, 
Nagel’s broader philosophy reveals a tighter link between his epistemology and 
metaphysics of mind than is typically thought to be the case. 
 As already noted, Tyler Burge’s interests in intentionality have been more 
explicit.  His work has consistently exhibited an intriguing approach to studies in 
the philosophy of mind, and this has most explicitly been displayed in his 
                                                 
6
  “What is it Like to be a Bat?” and “Psychophysical Nexus” 
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arguments against type and token materialism via his doctrine of anti-
individualism.  Anti-individualism posits mental events as partly independent of, 
and so not supervening entirely on, the nature or state of the agent’s neural states 
or events.  Instead, mental states are purported to be more broadly individuated by 
the agent’s environment.  There are aspects of mental states that are not 
immediately reflected in the material states of the brain.  Out of Burge’s focused 
study emerged a heightened awareness of the “...deep individuative relation 
between the individual’s being in mental states of certain kinds and the nature of 
the individual’s physical or social environments” (“Philosophy of Language and 
Mind: 1950-1990”, 47).  Many approaches to inquiries about mind assume an 
ontological priority of the brain, but Burge highlights an aspect of the mental that 
is not reflected in the brain. 
 Burge’s article “Modest Dualism” and his most recent work Origins of 
Objectivity (2010) will be taken together as constituting the culmination of his 
work on this deep individuative relation between the mental and external.  
“Modest Dualism” is the result of an exchange between Burge and Bernard W. 
Kobes.  The discourse began with Kobes’s article “Burge’s Dualism”, wherein he 
attempts to evaluate Burge’s arguments against type and token theories.  The 
discourse concludes with Burge’s evaluation of Kobes’ analysis, and a deeper and 
more explicit statement of Burge’s position as a dualist.  Kobes offers his own 
poignant allusions to anticipated materialistic difficulties, by considering what 
correlations between the nature and causal features of neural components of the 
brain and psychological components of the mind would look like.  Along with 
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Burge, Kobes concludes that both type and token-identity materialistic positions 
are untenable.  It’s clear from this that Burge and Kobes agree that if there is to be 
any tenable position for materialism, it will be a weaker form of materialism.  
Both philosophers agree that the weakest form of materialism would be 
something like compositional materialism, wherein the components of the mind 
would be composed or constituted of matter as a statue is composed or constituted 
of clay or marble. 
 In “Modest Dualism” Burge expresses appreciation for Kobes’s comments 
and praises him for his uniquely modest treatment of the subject.  Burge writes 
lucidly against the false hope of compositional materialism and argues for a 
modest dualism as the position most faithful to the concerns of science.  His 
position is grounded in rational intentionality, as manifest in the human 
psychology of propositional thought.  He offers two arguments.  The first 
considers the causal features of propositional thought and whether they are 
analogous to causal features of matter as understood in present material sciences.  
Burge’s second argument considers the nature of propositional thought, whether 
the structure of propositional thought is conceivably analogous to the physical 
structures of material composites.  Burge is clear in his stance.  Successful 
scientific explanations provide a determining criterion for whether a metaphysics 
of mind is tenable.  Ironically, (given materialism’s oft-proclaimed sonship to 
science) it is on the grounds of science that Burge believes materialism fails.  
Rational intentionality permeates Burge’s arguments against compositional 
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materialism, and so precludes his assent to any contemporary materialist 
positions. 
 The fuller picture that I hope will result from the analysis of Nagel’s work 
and Burge’s work, respectively, will be an increased awareness of rational 
intentionality as precluding materialistic accounts of intentionality.  Further, I 
hope to show that their views taken together constitute grounds for an argument 
from rationality against even the weakest form of materialism, compositional 
materialism.  I will develop such an argument, showing that the natural way in 
which we treat propositions and arguments precludes all materialistic notions of 
mind. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A REVIEW OF EARLIER APPROACHES TO RATIONALITY AND 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATURE OF THE MIND 
 Given the relative under-emphases rationality in recent philosophy of 
mind, it’s fitting that further development be prefaced with a brief survey of the 
cumulative work that has taken place to bring such an argument to the fore.  So, 
prior to further engagement with Nagel and Burge, I’ll briefly consider a few 
historical figures relevant to the philosophical discussion of rationality. 
3.1 Historical Antecedents 
 Both Plato and Aristotle view man as fundamentally rational.  Plato’s 
anthropology accounts for both the emotions and volitions associated with 
animalistic forms of life, but holds rationality as remarkably distinct from these 
other features of human life.  In book 4 of The Republic (441e-442c), Plato speaks 
of rationality as that essential faculty of the soul best suited to rule over the 
passions of the emotions and will.  Although Aristotle departs from the 
philosophy of his mentor in many respects, this was not one.  Aristotle took man 
to be a rational animal, and the virtue of man realized when rationality is 
governing.  Furthermore, in his Nichomachean Ethics he expresses his view that 
man as rational is most happy when living a life in full accord with reason (i.e., 
when living the “contemplative life”).  Both Plato and Aristotle, despite their 
many disagreements, agree that rational intentionality (as that directing one to 
knowledge of the good or telos) is that most basic constituent of man’s essence. 
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 For Aristotle, rationality is the telos in man.  In his Nichomachean Ethics, 
he develops his understanding of the telos as that pervasive element of reality that 
has limitless explanatory power.  Why are things the way they are?  Why is it that 
a horse has the features and functions it does?  Why do the concentric spheres 
move as they do?  The answer to such questions for Aristotle is grounded in the 
nature, or functional role, of the being or system. The telos is a non-corporeal, and 
so non-mechanistic, force innate and unique to a kind of being that functions to 
drive the being to fulfill its natural purpose.  Applied to man, the telos is manifest 
in the constitution of man as rational.  Rationality enables man to attain 
happiness.  Clearly, then, Aristotle sees rationality as non-corporeal and so not 
reducible to matter and its mechanistic forces. 
 Furthermore, within the Aristotelian tradition sensory qualities are 
understood corporeally.  My visual perception of redness objectively inheres in 
the mind-independent external object.  This redness is conveyed to my sensory 
apparatus and is thereafter communicated to the mind.  The redness of the 
external object (the ripe tomato) is not understood as distinctively mental, but as a 
purely objective quality inherent to the external object (the tomato itself).  My 
visual representation of redness is not distinctively mental.  Therefore, the 
Aristotelian man is distinct from mere animal, not in virtue of his perceptual 
representation of the external world, but in his being essentially rational.  For 
Aristotle, understanding rational intentionality is central to a proper understanding 
of the mind. 
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 Of course, Aristotle’s notion of telos has been abandoned for more 
detailed forms of explanation.  During the burgeoning of science, in and after the 
scientific revolution, persons such as Copernicus, Galileo, Harvey, and Newton 
conformed themselves to a new way of viewing the world.  It was a mechanistic 
model that captured their minds, and sated their desires for scientific 
understanding.  Aristotelian (and Cartesian) philosophies of mind would be 
displaced by those models that more adequately tie mental phenomena to 
mechanisms of matter. 
 Furthermore, movements within modern philosophy made us aware of a 
primitive assumption in Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of man.  Locke’s 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities exposes this.  Primary 
qualities are those qualities that are essential to the nature of a thing, without 
which the thing would not be that kind of thing.  For example, in Aristotelian 
terms, a necessary condition of one being human is that one think.  If a thing does 
not think, it does not have the telos of a human and so cannot be a human.  
However, Aristotle took all perceived qualities (e.g., redness) as primary, within 
the external object itself.  However, Locke shows this to be a secondary quality 
not inherent in the object itself but mind-dependent.  Beginning with Locke, 
understanding of the mind seemed to burgeon so much as to suggest the potential 
to include all aspects of reality as mind-dependent.  The mind was not merely 
rational, but influencing the perception of external reality.  The Aristotelian 
dichotomy between animalistic forms of life and man became indistinguishable.  
The perceptual and conceptual aspects of human life were fused together in the 
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mind.  Consequently, if the brain can account for perception, it can account for 
phenomenology.  Furthermore, as if no argument is needed, it is assumed that 
physical mechanisms that explain phenomenology can also account for concept 
formation and the most complex features of propositional thought. 
 As a philosophically minded psychologist, William James engaged deeply 
with the psychological status of rationality.  His opposition to the associationists 
is analogous in approach to my own opposition of the contemporary metaphysical 
monist.  For the associationists a multiplicity of mental ideas compounded 
together equal a unified mind.  James takes this to be “like saying that the 
mathematical square of a plus that of b is equal to the square of a+b, a palpable 
untruth . . . In short, the two separate ideas can never by any logic be made to 
figure as one and the same thing as the ‘associated’ idea.” (The Principles of 
Psychology, 106)  Instead, to account for a complex concept, (say, a unicorn), 
wherein multiple ideas are compounded (features of a horse, with straight horn, 
etc.), the entity doing the compounding must be already existent.  That is, to 
account for the act of compounding one must infer a third entity acting as the 
mechanism (or agent) doing the work.   
 We might consider this an indirect argument against materialism.  Just as 
associationism posits that “the mind is constituted by a multiplicity of distinct 
‘ideas’ associated into a unity”, materialism posits that materially composed 
entities taken together simply are the mind, or agglomerate into a higher 
compound that is the mind.  The archetype for this analog to materialism is 
Hume’s introspective account wherein he introspects and sees no ‘self’ but only a 
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bundle of mental images.  The mental images are thought to compose the 
individual self.  However, Hume, when he introspects, may only see a bundle of 
mental images, but what is the perceiver performing the act of introspection? 
 For materialism there is, therefore, a simple combining of the concepts of 
a and b—“it’s there in the brain”—without recognition that the act of 
compounding ideas is conceptual and not perceptual.  This is the force of an 
emphasis on rational intentionality: materialism must explain such conceptual 
capacities through a monistic ontology.  The nature, structure, and causal powers 
of matter must explain the nature, structure and causal powers of mind. 
 For James, the gap between physical and mental phenomena is a logical 
gap, not bridgeable by reference to material composition: “I confess, therefore, 
that to posit a soul influenced in some mysterious way by the brain states and 
responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of 
least logical resistance...” (119).  He states further, 
[The theory of the Soul] declares that the principle of individuality 
within us must be substantial, for psychic phenomena are 
activities, and there can be no activity without a concrete agent.  
This substantial agent cannot be the brain but must be something 
immaterial; for its activity, thought, is both immaterial, and takes 
cognizance of immaterial things, and of material things in general 
and intelligible, as well as in particular and sensible ways,--all 
which powers are incompatible with the nature of matter, of which 
the brain is composed. (221, emphasis mine) 
 
Here, James offers three distinct reasons for taking the mind to be immaterial: i) 
thought is immaterial, ii) thought considers ‘immaterial things’, and iii) thought 
considers concrete material things in general and in particular through categorical 
distinctions at a universal, objective level.  These aspects of rational intentionality 
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are treated as categorically distinct from all delineated powers of matter.  James’s 
concerns suggest that the inferring of some immaterial substance is rationally 
responsible—materialism is unwarranted in its persistent attempts to explain 
rationality from within a materialistic framework that doesn’t itself offer the terms 
necessary to account for the conceptual work involved in rationality. 
 With similar veins of thought, Donald Davidson argues for the 
anomalousness of the mental by affirming the compatibility of three principles: i) 
some mental events interact causally with physical events; ii) events related as 
cause and effect fall under strict laws; iii) there are no strict laws relating mental 
events to physical events.  (i) and (ii) are taken as given, but apparently 
incompatible with (iii).  To argue for compatibility, then, is to argue for (iii).   
 To doubt (iii) one must take mental events as nomologically conjoined 
with physical events.  My holding of Euclid’s Elements in my hand and the 
optical perception of ordered symbols on a page may be part of the physical 
description of nomological relations in space and time; why the book is where it 
is—why I am in the library and not at home—why I am seated and not standing.  
However, if the mental is reducible to the physical the nomological status of the 
physical description is also sufficient to explain my taking Euclid’s argument as 
sound.  Yet, this is clearly not the case.  Neither my willingness to consider the 
argument nor my concern to believe the argument in light of alternatives, is 
descriptive in physical terms.  The mental cannot be reduced to the physical since 
the essential characteristics of each are distinct; the nomological nature of the 
physical cannot incorporate or relate wholly to the normative nature of the mental.  
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Davidson concludes that there are no psychophysical laws, and so (i), (ii), and (iii) 
are commensurable.  His focus, then, is on the anomalous nature of the mental, 
namely as constituted by laws that govern description of mental events, especially 
those of propositional thought. 
 However, Davidson’s position is in one way naturalistic.  Though no type 
of mental event is reducible to a type of physical events, the token of a mental 
event is identical linked to its token physical event.  Token mental events 
supervene token physical events, though the laws are themselves not reducible in 
nature.  Though not reducible in nature and so not nomologically explainable 
according to physical terms, all is physically derived. 
 There have been significant philosophical contributions that argue, 
consistently with James’s concerns, that human rationality cannot be accounted 
for through material, and more particularly through naturalistic, models.  These 
contributions attempt to expose naturalism as untenable in light of human 
capacities for knowledge and belief.  I’ll now consider a few of these recent 
contributions. 
3.2 Recent Antecedents: C.S. Lewis, Reppert, and Plantinga 
 
 C.S. Lewis offers an argument from reason against naturalism that relies 
heavily on what is aptly conveyed in the words of evolutionary biologist J.B.S. 
Haldane.  Haldane states,  
It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product 
of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the 
motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my 
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beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not 




Lewis builds on this picture in the following way, 
[The popular scientific picture] professes to depend on inferences 
from observed facts. Unless inference is valid, the whole picture 
disappears. Unless we can be sure that reality in the remotest 
nebula or the remotest part obeys the thought laws of the human 
scientist here and now in his laboratory—in other words, unless 
Reason is an absolute—all is in ruins.  Yet those who ask me to 
believe this world picture also ask me to believe that Reason is 
simply the unforeseen and unintended by-product of mindless 
matter at one stage of its endless and aimless becoming. Here is 
the flat contradiction. They ask me at the same moment to accept a 
conclusion and to discredit the only testimony on which that 
conclusion can be based. The difficulty to me is a fatal one; and 
the fact that when you put it to many scientists, far from having an 
answer, they seem not even to understand what the difficulty is, 
assures me that I have not found a mare’s nest but detected a 
radical disease in their whole mode of thought from the very 
beginning. (The Weight of Glory, 135) 
 
Undoubtedly, Lewis’s focus is on reason as a faculty in man.  He is perplexed by 
it and respectful of science when its proponents ask that he take scientific 
inference as a valid means to knowledge about the world.  Lewis doesn’t appear 
to oppose this in any way.  However, his question is whether those professing the 
objectivity of inference (in supporting their own claims to knowledge) are 
themselves fully consistent with it in their scientific theory.  He takes two views 
to be incompatible: i) reason is absolute in man—an objective means to 
knowledge by application of universal laws of thought to all forms of being in all 
places at all times—justifying inferences from the universal to the particular and 
warranting judgment from the particular to the universal, and ii) reason is an 
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 Haldane, J.B.S., Possible World and Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: 
London, 1932, reprint, p.209. 
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evolving faculty proceeding out of the evolutionary development from hominid to 
human.   
 It is by the testimony of reason that we can attain knowledge.  If science is 
to tell us anything about the world, it must do so on the grounds of reason.  Its 
explanatory power must ground itself in reason, and in no way undermine it as a 
self-attesting basis for knowledge.  Yet, Lewis charges that the explicit claim of 
popular science (ii) does exactly that.  By taking reason to be a product of 
evolutionary processes, they undermine the potential validity of their own claims.  
 In his “De Futilitate” Lewis states, 
We are compelled to admit between the thoughts of a terrestrial 
astronomer and the behavior of matter several light-years away 
that particular relation which we call truth.  But this relation has no 
meaning at all if we try to make it exist between the matter of the 
star and the astronomer’s brain, considered as a lump of matter.  
The brain may be in all sorts of relations to the star no doubt: it is 
in a spatial relation, and a time relation, and a quantitative relation. 
But to talk of one bit of matter as being true about another bit of 
matter seems to me to be nonsense. (63-4) 
 
Lewis here develops the reason he takes the physicalist picture to be fatal to 
science.  If we are to take the brain as ontologically prior to the mind—the 
features of the mind being explainable by reference to the physical—we cannot 
transcend those limitations inherent to matter in virtue of its locality in space and 
time.  Furthermore, Lewis here expresses his difficulty in ascribing terms 
acquired by rational intentionality—true and false—to material substances. 
 Alvin Plantinga has promoted similar ideas, in his “evolutionary argument 
against naturalism” (EAAN), arguing that a purely naturalistic interpretation of 
reality will have difficulty providing a consistent account of reliability of belief.  
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If naturalistic, evolutionary processes account for the whole scope of existence, 
this all-encompassing schema will delineate how one is to understand the 
development of the human mind and its capacity for beliefs.  Plantinga offers two 
approaches to doubting the postulate of the evolved mind.  Both of these 
approaches supervene on the observation that we aim to believe with accuracy 
and this requires the reliability of those faculties enabling belief formation.   
 First, Plantinga considers a suggestion that natural selection can account 
for reliability in belief-formation.  The suggestion posits that the mental capacity 
for truth evolved as a survival mechanism, and that one’s capacity for truth is 
causally linked with one’s capacity for survival.  Plantinga points out that if this is 
true, the true belief will have a necessary connection with survival in virtue of its 
content.  He suggests that there is no necessary connection between the fitness 
development necessary for survival and the development of capacities necessary 
for reliable belief formation.  He states, 
Now if content of belief did enter the causal chain that leads to 
behavior…then natural selection…could shape the mechanisms 
that produce belief in the direction of greater reliability. There 
could then be selection pressure for true belief and for reliable 
belief-producing mechanisms. But under the hypothesis in 
question, the content of a belief, as opposed to its 
neurophysiological properties, does not enter into the causal chain 
leading to behavior. And then it is not the case that a belief 
produces adaptive behavior by way of being true, or maladaptive 
behavior by way of being false. So natural selection can’t, directly, 
at any rate, mold belief-producing mechanisms in the direction of 
the production of reliability by rewarding adaptive behavior and 
penalizing maladaptive behavior. (Naturalism Defeated, 257, 
emphasis added) 
 
  30 
Under the hypothesis of natural selection, then, Plantinga holds that the content of 
belief is not contained in the causal chain leading to behavior.  That is, Plantinga 
takes naturalism as limited to the terms of the physical sciences, in which case a 
physical state, event, relation—type or token—is attributed with all the 
explanatory power necessary to account for survival.  For Plantinga, belief is, on 
all naturalistic accounts, irrelevant.  As such, the naturalistic, physicalist picture 
precludes any appeal to belief as attaining to objectivity in knowledge. 
Second, Plantinga asks his reader to consider his or her own conclusion 
concerning naturalism.  Whether in belief or unbelief, each one treats one’s own 
doxastic capacity as sufficiently equipped to make some degree of judgment in 
favor of his belief and against opposing alternatives.  This evinces one’s own trust 
in one’s mental faculties as a reliable belief-forming apparatus.  Given this trust in 
our belief-forming apparatus, an implied criterion is that one must have a 
metaphysical ground that warrants this trust through the guarantee that one’s 
belief-forming apparatus is in fact trustworthy.  For Plantinga, this is a criterion 
which naturalism cannot satisfy because its metaphysics has nothing to guarantee 
the reliability of belief; there is no reason to think that a subjective, perception-
oriented biological system has developed the capacity to reach beyond material 
dispositions and attain to objective reliability in belief formation about matters 
outside of one’s immediate perception. 
 Any naturalistic attempt to answer Plantinga’s concerns will implicitly 
affirm reliability.  However, the key point Plantinga is making is that naturalism 
itself offers no grounds for such reliability, but inherently denies rational agents 
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any access to non-arbitrary methods of evaluation.  If all is natural, and the 
metaphysical aspects of the mind are entirely materially constituted, then there is 
nothing objective outside of material dispositions to ground the epistemological 
appeals (argument showing good reasoning) necessary for believing one’s own 
belief to be true, or to judge the belief of another to be false. 
 In Reppert’s article “The Argument from Reason” he attempts to refute 
the naturalistic view of the mind.  The argument is similar to Plantinga’s EAAN 
and is in name and content a further explication of C.S Lewis’s comments on 
rationality.  Reppert’s argument from reason and Plantinga’s evolutionary 
argument against naturalism both argue that there is no way in which an 
evolutionary account of the mind can ground the capacity necessary to grasp the 
objective categories necessary for meaning and truth.  Reppert’s most relevant 
contribution comes through in the following statement,  
[Materialists] not only believe that the world is material, they also 
perforce believe that the truth about that material world can be 
discovered by people in the sciences, and that, furthermore, there 
are philosophical arguments that ought to persuade people to 
eschew mentalistic worldviews in favor of materialistic 
ones…Arguments from reason are arguments that appeal to 
necessary conditions of rational thought and inquiry. (The 
Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, 351) 
 
I take Reppert’s comments to be a reproof of materialists, holding to materialism 
in word but then turning to argue for materialism on the basis of capacities that 
cannot be explained through that system.  If we are to say that some belief p is 
true (say, a belief that the number of primes is infinite) and then give reasons for 
our belief (cite Euclid’s proof), there are necessarily presupposed conditions lying 
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at the foundations of our mental activity.  It is the job of arguments from reason to 
make the nature of these presupposed conditions explicit.  The very argument that 
materialism is true relies on notions of reason and argument that are difficult, 
perhaps even impossible, to account for within the schema of materialism given 
the apparent connection between matter and subjectivity.  Arguments from reason 
exploit a notion of objectivity, necessarily presupposed in making claims, in order 
to show that these presuppositions preclude any claim to materialism. In this, it 
seems that the Lewis-Reppert-Plantinga arguments are helpful in making explicit 
some oft-neglected aspects of rationality—aspects that should be of great 
significance to those in the philosophy of mind. 
 It is clear that each argument from reason, offered by Lewis, Reppert, and 
Plantinga, implicitly assumes the following axiom: one’s metaphysical claims 
ought to comport with one’s epistemic presuppositions.  That is, one’s beliefs 
ought not exceed the dependability of one’s metaphysical ground for belief.  One 
is only warranted to claim one’s view is true (universally) if one’s metaphysical 
view of the mind permits one’s transcending the subjective (i.e. warrants 
universal claims).  The naturalistic/evolutionary view of the mind, believing the 
material brain to be ontologically prior (perhaps problematic in itself), must 
assume the mind is developed entirely from matter and so limited by the 
subjective material parameters of space and time.  It claims to be true 
(universally), but inherently denies the objective capacity necessary for such 
claims (thereby precluding any claim of its truth across space and time, or 
between subjects).  The only way, then, to truly ground the reliability of our 
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beliefs is to have something or someone (for Plantinga, God) guaranteeing the 
validity of our capacity for truth.  Plantinga concludes that naturalism cannot 
ground the universality of its own claim to truth.  Thus, given the nature of belief 
and our desire for reliability, belief in the schema of metaphysical naturalism is 
irrational. 
 It’s noteworthy that C.S. Lewis, Reppert, and Plantinga have each 
attempted to argue that theism is the worldview best suited to account for the 
human capacity for rationality.  However, for those wary of supernaturalism it 
should be noted that Nagel’s view of reason is at least as robust as that of Lewis 
or Plantinga.  Yet, Nagel is not a theist.  In The Last Word Nagel expresses the 
fear that his view will be disparaged because of its non-naturalistic implications.  
He argues that a non-naturalistic metaphysic of the mind doesn’t necessitate 
theism.  As will be seen in the discussion of “Psychophysical Nexus”, he offers an 
alternative position to theism that he believes is compatible with his rejection of 
standard naturalistic accounts of the human mind.   
 On this basis, my hope, and Nagel’s hope, is that prejudices against 
immaterial notions of the mind be ousted; what is said of the mind is something 
said of the mind, and not of God.  As we’ll see to be a sort of irony, Burge and 
Nagel, who are not theists of any sort, explicitly reprove proponents of naturalism 
as tainting their field with dogmatic prejudices.  Just as non-materialism can be 
dogmatically promoted as entailing other major positions, materialism can be 
dogmatically promoted as inferring the counter-positions of those major non-
materialistic positions.  Philosophical integrity ought to oblige us to treat our 
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theistic or naturalistic concerns as distinct from, or at least in mediate relation to, 
our ideas of the mind.  Views of mind are not sufficient in themselves to provide 
any mandate for theistic or naturalistic claims.  In line with Nagel’s contention, I 
think it wise to allow arguments for the metaphysical status of mind to be 
evaluated as such, and no more. 
 This historical review serves to support my claim that there seems to be a 
significant relation between one’s idea of reason (whether naturalistic or 
otherwise) and one’s understanding of the human mind.  One may believe one’s 
materialism to be warranted because one has a diminished view of rationality.  In 
like manner, to those having a grander view of the nature of rationality in the 
individual (i.e., a faculty giving the individual the ability to compound concepts, 
or to understand “how things are” in a universally applicable manner), the 
outright claims to materialism, as based on appeals to contemporary material 
science, appear highly dubitable.  With this in mind, it seems reasonable to 
consider Nagel’s claims concerning epistemology more carefully in order to better 
understand the full force of this view of rationality as a foundational stance 
against materialism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NAGEL’S REASON-FOCUSED EPISTEMOLOGY 
4.1 An Argument for its Determinative Influence on His Non-Materialist 
Metaphysics 
 A brief review of some of Nagel’s work was given above.  As mentioned 
there, it is my contention that Nagel’s approach to the philosophy of mind should 
be much more broadly construed than it typically is.  To understand the breadth of 
Nagel’s views concerning the mind, one must understand his view of reason.  As 
suggested in the review of Davidson’s materialism, there are primarily two 
options open to those considering a view about reason.  One position views reason 
as a base form of intentionality, involving other subjective aspects of 
consciousness such as perception, emotion and desire (ii)
8
; this is a common view 
amongst contemporary philosophers of mind.  The alternative is that reason, 
although a form of intentionality, cannot be thought of as an aspect of the material 
and its subjective parameters, but rather, given objectivity, must transcend -- even 
logically precede—the perceiving subject.  This latter notion is implicit in the 
work of Plantinga and Reppert, though I think they fall short of offering the 
robust explication given in Nagel’s work. 
 In contending for his view of reason, Nagel cites Saul Kripke as one of his 
major influences.  Nagel states in the preface of The Last Word, 
In the late 1970s I attended a seminar Saul Kripke gave at 
Princeton, in which he attacked various forms of relativism, 
skepticism, subjectivism, or revisionism about logic. He argued 
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that classical logic could not be qualified in any of those ways, that 
it was simply correct . . . the skeptics all rely on it in their own 
thinking. (vii) 
 
Nagel goes on in the same passage to iterate, “...the last word in philosophical 
disputes about the objectivity of any form of thought must lie in some unqualified 
thoughts about how things are--thoughts that remain, however hard we may try to 
get outside of them or to regard them merely as contingent psychological 
dispositions” (vi).  These thoughts, or presuppositions, that remain are akin to the 
necessary conditions alluded to by Reppert -- those thoughts, or principles of 
thought, which cannot be questioned because they make questioning possible.  
Nagel’s commitment to reason grounds his argument against subjectivity about 
reason in such a way that it precludes all materialistic attempts to naturalize 
reason.  On this basis, with respect to his dissent with materialism, Nagel’s 
epistemological views are paramount to his own explicit contributions concerning 
qualia (see “Psychophysical Nexus”). 
 In the introduction to The Last Word Nagel states,  
 
Reason, if there is such a thing, can serve as a court of appeal not 
only against the received opinions and habits of our community but 
also against the peculiarities of our personal perspective.  It is 
something each individual can find within himself, but at the same 
time it has universal authority . . . Whoever appeals to reason 
purports to discover a source of authority within himself that is not 
merely personal, or societal, but universal--and that should also 
persuade others who are willing to listen to it. (3) 
 
Merged with Nagel’s prior notion of the self-attesting authority of reason, this 
latter notion of “universal authority” is remarkably strong.  Reason acts as an 
intrapersonal and interpersonal authority that constitutes the means by which 
  37 
otherwise perspective-oriented beings are to understand a belief to be valid, and 
so rationally tenable or true.  It provides access to a transcendent authority 
unhindered by the “peculiarities of our personal perspective”; that is, unhindered 
by the peculiarities of localized characteristics of reality.  If there is such a thing 
as reason the human capacity to reason requires a substantive ground that can 
account for this transcendence.  Further, any attempt to give an explanation to 
others for one’s beliefs or actions – even in appealing to subjective concerns – is 
implicitly or explicitly (perhaps unconsciously) appealing to this authority as the 
ground for justification common to all reasoners. 
 Superficially, Nagel’s epistemic ideals may seem anachronistic, 
particularly in his magisterial view of reason.  On this judgment, his position 
might be quickly discounted as a form of rationalism.  Yet, if I can do justice to 
Nagel’s rational objectivism, we should see that Nagel’s claims are a modestly 
construed rationalism.  He does not postulate reason to be the far-reaching source 
of truth that typifies traditional rationalism.  Instead, he begins with a 
rudimentary, intelligible claim that sets his position in opposition to the neo-
Kantian subjectivism in contemporary philosophical thought.  His claim is that 
reason is the self-attesting authority in human thought enabling our objective 
evaluation of propositions (consider again his citation of Kripke).  Again, “It is 
something each individual can find within himself, but at the same time it has 
universal authority”. This transcendental aspect of rationality is expressed clearly 
in the statement, “One cannot question the authority of reason, because to do so 
one would be using reason to attempt to question reason”; one would be implicitly 
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affirming the very thing in presupposition that one is attempting to explicitly 
question in theory.  Such “thoughts” cannot be escaped, even through the most 
radical skepticism.  Similarly, Nagel states, “Simple logical thoughts dominate all 
others and are dominated by none, because there is no intellectual position we can 
occupy from which it is possible to scrutinize those thoughts without 
presupposing them” (The Last Word, 64).  In this way, reason is self-attesting.  
The charge that the argument is circular (i.e., that it presupposes reason to argue 
for reason) doesn’t hold, since to form such a criticism one has already 
presupposed reason’s authority.9 
 Further, the authoritative nature of reason grounds one’s capacity to test 
the validity of propositions, even identifying alternatives and evaluating their 
tenability.  It allows the mind to infer principles, to do science.  Recall Newton’s 
theory of light.  The practical application of reason was necessary to isolate the 
relevant phenomena through the use of a prism, and then to further construct a 
situation that was conducive to falsifiability of the challenging claim.  Further, it 
                                                 
9
  Though I am not aware of anywhere Nagel cashes out the term “reason”, it 
seems reasonable to think he is appealing to laws fit for universal application.  For 
example, one may think of the law of identity (i.e., a is a) and the law of non-
contradiction (i.e., a cannot be both F and non-F in the same respect at the same 
time; a predicate cannot be both affirmed and denied of a subject in the same 
respect at the same time).  From this could be derived the kind of standard he is 
alluding to: In order to critique any claim, one would use the law of identity to 
identify the claim being made, and then further use the law of non-contradiction 
to distinguish it from all alternative claims including the claim one may suggest to 
put in its place.  On this basis, to doubt the laws of thought, for example the law 
of identity and the law of non-contradiction, would be the epitome of 
inconsistency—doubting that set of laws which grounds one’s ability to doubt.  
One may also attribute propositional laws with similar (deductive) epistemic 
strength to this view of reason. 
  39 
is through reason that we grasp the meaning of a statement and judge it to be true 
or false.  Consider again, Euclid’s theorem.  To doubt his conclusion would be to 
doubt fundamental principles that ground mathematics.  Even if one were to doubt 
his conclusion, one would use reason to identify his position and then propose 
more fundamental, unquestionable grounds, by which one can know.  As such, 
reason is not personal or subjective.  Nagel states, “To reason is to think 
systematically in ways anyone looking over my shoulder ought to be able to 
recognize as correct.” (5)  Though reason is to inquire into one’s own subjective 
concerns, it is a self-attesting authority that stands apart from any one individual 
and reveals one’s degree of consistency with the objective standards necessary for 
any thought to occur.  We can consider the means by which Newton and Euclid 
reach their conclusions respectively.  Furthermore, as rational agents we can 
objectively judge by the use of our shared, yet impersonal and non-conventional, 
authority, whether their use of those means accords with what reason requires. 
 To this point, Nagel’s view of reason has been strictly epistemological.  
However, as already mentioned, this view of reason has significant implications 
for one’s view of the mind.  Throughout The Last Word Nagel’s epistemology is 
intertwined with a wonder about the human mind and its capacity for reason.  He 
anticipates the materialistic reduction of human rationality to natural terms, but 
rejects it as implausible:   
Reason is whatever we find we must use to understand anything, 
including itself. And if we try to understand it merely as a natural 
(biological or psychological) phenomenon, the result will be an 
account incompatible with our use of it and with the understanding 
of it we have in using it. For I cannot trust a natural process unless 
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I can see why it is reliable, any more than I can trust a mechanical 
algorithm unless I can see why it is reliable. And to see that I must 
rely on reason itself. (143) 
 
To derive a valid ontology, one must have a valid epistemology.  This is the very 
point already seen in Plantinga’s work.  The point should be emphatically 
impressed here: the very attempt to naturalize reason and the mind requires that 
one presuppose a view of reason (and the mind in which it inheres) that cannot be 
explained by reference to material states, powers, or events.  Thus, this 
presupposed view of reason and mind logically precludes any such naturalization.  
The truth of any such explanation can only be established upon the broader, 
objective scope of reason, which it seeks to undermine.
10
  Rationality, not being 
in any way logically explicable in material terms, implicates similar necessary 
truths for the mind so endowed with it.   
 This is an easy inference for Nagel, one with which he colors the pages of 
The Last Word in a sense of wonder.
11
  He states, “How is it possible that 
creatures like ourselves, supplied with the contingent capacities of a biological 
species whose very existence appears to be radically accidental, should have 
                                                 
10
  Upon this basis, relativism is also precluded.  Spending a chapter on 
mathematics and another on science, Nagel’s The Last Word sets out a clear 
argument that all relative claims are intrinsically universal; the claim “all is 
relative” is a claim that has universal application.  Humankind may attempt to 
escape the “pretensions of human reason”, but it cannot succeed (99). 
11
 It may be suggested here by some that ‘wonder’ connotes mystery, and that an 
unexplained phenomenon (here, rational intentionality) is a problem for all and as 
such is a problem for none.  However, by ‘wonder’ I don’t intend to connote 
mystery.  Rather, I take such wonderment to be a negative way to the truth. By 
understanding rational intentionality, we can at least understand what the mind is 
not and work from there.  The content-rich wonder of the dualist is the foundation 
for proof against materialism.   
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access to universally valid methods of objective thought.” (4)  Just as epistemic 
inquiry unveils the irreducibility of reason to that which is natural, it similarly 
bears metaphysical implications as it touches the human capacity to reason; 
human minds, presupposing standards of reason, have access to understand 
universals (e.g., forms of being, changes or adaptations, causality) and as such 
this capacity cannot be reduced to the obvious spatial and temporal limitations of 
material composites.
 
 It is understandable, at one level, that one be perplexed by this account of 
reason.  Materialism, and more broadly naturalism, has been credited with the 
wider range of practical and theoretical successes of science.  Naturalistic 
assumption has been represented as the necessary and sufficient motivation 
behind reasonable explanations of nature.  When such a metaphysical theory is 
credited with such power and success, it will likely appear reasonable to the 
masses to accept such a theory.  Nagel expresses an understanding for initial 
skepticism toward this view of reason.  He states, “How is it possible for finite 
beings like us to think infinite thoughts?”  (74)  Examples of such thoughts may 
be those universally applicable judgments exemplified in Newton’s judgments 
regarding light’s nature and Euclid’s judgments of necessary truths following 
from the nature of ‘1’ and ‘indivisibility’.  We do reach for and attain knowledge.  
Nagel would not allow his wonderment toward reason in the human mind to be 
construed as skepticism.  That would be to attempt to call into question that which 
cannot consistently be questioned—a wonderment toward reason is only 
reinforced by the challenges of skepticism.  To attempt to naturalize reason only 
  42 
implicitly reaffirms its nature as unexplainable by reference to any naturalistic or 
material processes.  Wonderment, then, is inescapable for the one who begins to 
grasp the robust nature of reason. 
 Additionally, it is important to understand the epistemic status of those 
positions attempting to cast doubt on such a view of reason.  Materialism holds 
that “all is matter”, and naturalism complements this position by attempting to 
explain origins of time, life, and natural kinds by limiting explanatory reference to 
uniform material forces acting in the course of time to produce the present effects.  
These positions are together assumed true by many great minds working within 
the contemporary material sciences.  However, despite the popularity of this 
position, it cannot be proven true.  Both positions assume that all knowledge is 
attained by observation, through empirical observation; essentially all knowledge 
is by sense experience.  And yet this position can be called into question: Why 
assume that all knowledge is by sense experience?  Secondly, why take our 
observational capacities to be reliable?  Consequently, the belief that all is matter 
cannot be empirically verified.  Furthermore, without proof for the position its 
epistemic status is in question.  As such, it cannot be justifiably credited with 
theoretical advancement.  There is no explanatory power in the belief “all is 
matter”.  Therefore, any successes of the sciences could be credited to other 
metaphysical positions in similar ways.  Furthermore, material sciences may find 
a greater ground in that metaphysical position that can ground the mind, since it 
would in turn offer grounds for understanding the use of rationality as it relates to 
studies within the scientific realm. 
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 There is no reason to doubt reason, and in fact one finds that it cannot be 
doubted.  It is a necessary, presupposed condition for our ability to make claims 
that are objective in nature.  Nagel states, 
If I try to get outside of my logical or arithmetical thoughts by 
regarding them as mere manifestations of my nature, then I will be 
left with biology or psychology or sociology as the final level of 
first-order thought…When I try to regard such a thought as a mere 
phenomenon, I cannot avoid also thinking its content -- cannot 
retreat to thinking of it merely as words or pictures going through 
my head, for example. That content is a logical proposition, which 
would be true even if I were not in existence or were unable to 
think it. The thought is therefore about something independent of 
my mind, of my conceptual capacities, and of my existence, and 
this too I cannot get outside of, for every supposition that might be 
brought forward to cast doubt on it simply repeats it to me again.  
(66) 
   
How am I to doubt my capacity for the objective, when the doubt itself “simply 
repeats it to me again”?  Having been influenced by a culture where materialism 
is so often assumed, we will each, like Nagel, have difficulty accepting this view 
of rationality.  However, if one is to choose between materialism, which makes it 
difficult to conceive how subjectivity-bound matter would constitute grounds for 
objective understanding, and a realist view of rationality that cannot be denied 
with consistency, the rational choice seems clear.
12
 
                                                 
12
  Here, I’m reminded of William Lycan’s “Giving Dualism Its Due” wherein he 
weighs the oft-referenced “problems” of dualism, and admits the position more 
formidable than is often granted.  “Though the arguments for dualism (indeed) 
fail, so do the arguments for materialism”.  Although, his materialism wins out in 
his mind, he admits that he does “not proportion [his] belief to the evidence”.  I’d 
like to allow Lycan’s continued antagonism toward dualism, but then ask if this 
continued opposition is itself rationally warranted. Given the robust nature of 
reason as ultimate authority in the realm of thought, constituting our very capacity 
to think and speak, I take the probability of dualism to rationally outweigh the 
tentative hopes of materialism. 
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 Nagel anticipates attempts to draw supernatural implications out of this 
reason-oriented philosophy of mind, and so he concludes the The Last Word 
attempting to dispel this idea.  With like caution, though, he emphasizes that a 
fear of religion doesn’t justify the unwarranted “...overuse of evolutionary biology 
to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind” 
(131).  Naturalistic dogma doesn’t digest any better than theistic dogma; both are 
dogma, and so not welcome in philosophical discussions of the mind.  For Nagel, 
one must affirm the real wonder that humans think and follow that truth to where 
it leads. 
§4.2: Tying It In: Epistemological Implications for the Nature of Mind 
 Nagel’s contribution makes explicit the implicit presuppositions involved 
in all human thought, and he offers a more thorough explication of it than most.  
As such, he takes reason to be an impersonal capacity to consider and make 
objective judgments with universal authority.  A human’s judgments can be 
entirely distinct from all particulars of time, space, and matter and in our act of 
believing we treat it so, simpliciter.  Clearly, Nagel’s concern in The Last Word is 
far more than forming an argument against epistemological subjectivism.  Rather, 
his concerns are about how it is that we grasp universals, unavoidably attain to the 
objective in our claims, do science, engage with the meaningfulness of sound 
logic, and have objective self-attesting grounds on our side to reprove others 
when they use reason inconsistently in these tasks.  We apply universal theories to 
numbers and attempt to grasp the fundamental structure of the universe, whether 
intelligible or unintelligible.  This isn’t limited to the theoretical either, but every 
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layman will call out injustice if his employer attempts to claim that a paradigm 
shift in the area of mathematics has negatively affected his paycheck.  On what 
basis can we make sense of this capacity we have as conscious beings to evaluate 
the thoughts of one another and judge them reasonable or not, according to some 
objective standard that transcends our physical place in space and time?  Clearly, 
Nagel’s view of reason delineates his unbelief with respect to naturalistic 
materialism and its attempts to reduce rationality to the human brain or its 
complex subjective functions.  For emphasis, consider it once more:  If 
materialism is true, in one’s forming or evaluating an argument how does one 
warrant use of faculties that logically presuppose a capacity to transcend the 
spatial limitations of matter?  In the act of evaluation one is reaching beyond 
one’s spatial limitations and materially composed brain to make a judgment that is 
universally applicable.  In my saying, “There are no square-circles”, I am 
presupposing an ability to transcend the spatially limited capacities of sense 
perception; I am claiming that I do not need to travel to the dark side of the moon 
to see if there is a square-circle.  If my thoughts are to have any value and 
coherence—any reason to be believed—I must assume that mutually exclusive 
concepts cannot be combined without undermining my very ability to think, 
speak, argue, believe or know.  To relate to the previous examples, what is it for 
Newton or Euclid to make the objective claims they have made?  What is it for us 
to evaluate those judgments and judge for ourselves whether their grounds for 
reasoning are adequate for our own system of beliefs?  For both the theorist and 
the layman there is a common authority assumed which, when used fully 
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according to our capacity, is claimed to yield grounds for belief that are more than 
subjective, or personal or conventional, but logically binding on all thinkers.  For 
Nagel, this common presupposed capacity is wondrous and can only be denied 
through the austere dogmatism of naturalism and inconsistency between one’s 
practice and theory. 
 
  47 
CHAPTER 5 
BURGE’S VIEW OF INTENTIONALITY 
5.1 On Origins of Objectivity 
 
 Objectivity is instantiated in the dualistic capacities of perception and 
conception.  After delineating a clear view of perception as occurrent in variant 
forms within biological life, Burge anticipates an attempt to ascribe to him a 
deflationary view of rationality.  To obviate any such attempt he states, 
“Perception is constitutively independent of capacities for propositional thought.” 
(548)  Further, he holds that perception is not a propositional state (537) and it is 
structurally distinct from propositional states. (538)  Burge further develops this 
groundwork in explicating the constitutive nature of perceptual capacities, 
A perceptual state functions to apply to particulars in a singular 
context-dependent way.  Perception is always as of particulars.  So 
the veridicality condition of a perception must contain singular 
representational elements.  Perception always categorizes or 
groups particulars that it represents.  A perceptual state functions 
to indicate properties, relations, or kinds, and to attribute them to 
particulars.  So the veridicality condition must also contain general 
attributive elements.  These attributive elements are inevitably 
from a perspective.  They are one of many possible ways of 
perceptually attributing whatever property, relation, or kind is 
attributed . . . I think it is the fact that attributive abilities are never 
exercised separately from singular applications in perception that 
helps mark the non-conceptual, non-propositional status of 
perception. (539; emphasis mine) 
 
Burge’s comments here are apropos, conveying the inextricable link between 
perception, the particular and the limitations of the empirical perspective to 
singular applications.  He takes the nature of perception to be constitutively 
captured in the application of particulars within a singular context-dependent, 
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even context-bound, attribution dependent on one’s subjective perspective in the 
here and now.  As such, the sorts of objectivity involved in perceiving and 
referring to a particular are perhaps a mystery.  However, there is little reason to 
take them as non-empirical.  The objective reference of thought is a different 
matter altogether.  Burge states, 
… [the] problem of explaining how objective reference emerges in 
thought is [in]…explaining what it is to separate attribution from 
its role in aiding singular reference, to arrive at propositional 
predication . . . In thought…we commonly make occurrent use of 
attributives that do not guide a contextual singular application in 
singling out a referent. (541)   
 
This distinction between singular reference and propositional predication enables 
the “specific context independence and generality that are embodied in pure 
attribution, propositional thought, and rational inference.” (539)  Burge terms this 
capacity for conceptualization ‘pure attribution’ and gives examples wherein 
attributives do not guide a “context-bound reference to a particular: cats and are 
animals in cats are animals; plants and are green in plants are green; is a number 
in 3 is a number”. (541)  Burge calls these pure attributions “conceptual 
attributives, or predicates”.  They serve in propositional structures to free thinkers 
from the context-bound reference to particulars, and mere singular application of 
attributives.  He holds that this mental capacity for pure attribution is necessary 
for any propositional or conceptual ability to be real. (541)  In this way, where 
such attributives are used they manifest the subject’s capacity to “engage in pure 
attribution”. 
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 Pure attribution offers more explicit grounds upon which to explicate the 
nature of propositional attitudes.  Burge states, 
With propositional attitudes, there is the beginning of a freeing of 
occurrent representation from presentation of particulars.  Pure 
attribution marks a subtle kind of freedom from the here and now.  
This freeing of attribution, in pure attribution, from a role in 
context-bound singling-out of particulars is a step beyond the 
primitive objectivity involved in perception…Pure attribution, 
including conceptual attributives, marks a capacity to separate 
attribution, a constitutive element in any representational 
perspective, from its role in guiding contextual singling-out of 
particulars that have a causal impact on the individual and the 
individual’s perspective. (542) 
 
In the separation of attribution from its limited perceptual uses, an agent exhibits a 
capacity entirely distinct from that capacity that is dependent upon the here and 
now.  Instead, the agent is purported to transcend his or her own environment and 
obtain warrant or justification in the broader application—even universal 
application—of a relevant judgment.  Without this capacity for pure attribution, 
an agent “cannot engage in representation that is functionally independent of a 
role (either an attributive role or a singular applicational role) in contextually 
referring to particulars. [Because] perception is essentially, at every point, 
context-bound singling-out of particulars.” (542)  Pure attribution constitutes a 
higher-level objectivity than any that can be obtained through capacities of 
perception because it attains to the non-perspectival truth. 
 To further support this claim consider Burge’s comment, “What it is for an 
attributive concept to be a conceptualization is partly that it has uses, in the 
individual’s psychology, beyond the use (essential to perceptual attributives) of 
modifying singular applications to particulars. It has pure-attributional uses.” 
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(545)  Consequently, the mental capacity exhibited in the grasping of concepts 
enables the individual to engage in propositional inferences that are constitutively 
distinct from the context-bound reference involved in the subjective perceptions 
of particulars.  Burge holds that this capacity for concepts is constitutively 
“marked by logical constants (such as not, either-or, if-then, is identical to).” 
(545)  This is akin to Nagel’s epistemology which postulates reason to be  
…something each individual can find within himself, but at the 
same time it has universal authority…Whoever appeals to reason 
purports to discover a source of authority within himself that is not 
merely personal, or societal, but universal—and that should also 
persuade others who are willing to listen to it. (3)   
 
The rationality of Nagel is taken to be reflected in Burge’s view of pure 
attribution, as that capacity to transcend the here and now, the environmental 
influences on perspective, and the singular context-dependent reference to 
particulars.  To further support this relation between the ideologies of Burge and 
Nagel consider that upon referencing Nagel on objectification, Burge explicates 
pure attribution as that capacity which enables “the separation of representation 
from the proximal, the local, the idiosyncratic, the subjective.” (548)   
 For materialism to answer this question, there must be some natural 
mechanism by which attributive abilities involved in objectification in perception 
are related to and so ground the origination of pure attribution in propositional 
thought.  Yet, use of pure attributives inherently involves an attempt to attain to 
the objective and so implicitly exhibit one’s presupposed warrant for taking 
oneself as having the capacity to transcend the subjective.  This is further 
exhibited in making claims that are not context-bound to the singular context in 
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which one finds oneself in the here and now.  Do the essential features of 
materialism include the terms necessary to explain how humans could be capable 
of such grand transcendence over context-bound reference and the more general 
limitations inherent in the spatial locality of the brain?  Is there any conceivable 
mechanism that could enable, and thereby account for, this capacity so common 
to members of humankind?  Perhaps the more basic question is whether 
materialists are at all aware of such a need to account for this capacity, or whether 
their inquiries into mind are wholly neglecting accounts of objectivity in rational 
intentionality. 
5.2 Does materialism offer a ground for mental functions? 
 In contrast to Nagel’s The Last Word, Burge’s work in “Modest Dualism” 
and Origins of Objectivity does not begin in epistemology.  Nonetheless, Burge’s 
view of reason, as it exists in the human psychological capacity for understanding 
the objective, plays a large role in his stance against materialism.  As mentioned 
above, Burge’s discourse with Kobes is primarily focused on whether the weakest 
form of materialism, compositional materialism, could be true.  This is the theory 
that “...mental states and events are composed of physical entities”.  For Burge, 
compositional materialism is a “heuristic strategy” grounded in the explanatory 
success of science, and he distinguishes this strategic use of compositional 
materialism, or heuristic device, from belief in the position.  He takes belief to be 
entirely unreasonable at this stage of inquiry (“Modest Dualism”, 235).  He states, 
“...[materialism] has no positive support in science as applied to propositional 
thought, and nearly none as applied to consciousness” (236).  (Note here Burge’s 
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emphasis on propositional thought, over and against consciousness, as posing the 
greater difficulty for materialism.)  This emphasis on propositional thought is 
made explicit in the two arguments he offers against compositional materialism. 
5.3 Delineating Burge’s Dualism 
Burge views his own position as firmly dualistic.  He states, “I am no type 
of physicalist or materialist” (249).  His dualism is curiously unique in that it is 
not set against materialism on the basis of purely metaphysical or ontological 
commitments, but rather on the basis of his respect for science.  “Modest 
Dualism” begins with this emphasis, purporting the tenets of natural science and 
common sense to be normative guidelines for philosophy: “My methodology 
requires metaphysical claims...to be grounded in specific knowledge that resides 
in explanations and judgments in science and common sense” (233; emphasis 
mine).  Burge believes that “...our best understanding of what sorts of things exist 
comes from reflecting on ontological commitments of explanations in science, or 
clear-cut judgments in common sense” (233).  Reflecting this normative 
framework, Burge holds that philosophy goes wayward when it fails to work 
within these bounds. 
 The implausibility of type materialism and token materialism is made 
explicit by expositing the doctrine of anti-individualism already mentioned, 
wherein neural correlates do not account for the broader scope of influence 
enacted upon one’s mental states by one’s environment.  Burge sets forth the 
qualifications for this most tenable materialism: 
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The burden on compositional materialism is heavy. It must 
correlate neural causes and their effects with psychological causes 
and their effects. And it must illuminate psychological causation, 
of both physical and psychological effects, in ways familiar from 
the material sciences . . . For the psychological causing event to be 
composed materially, psychological causation must depend on the 
causation of the material parts in one of the ways familiar from 
causation in the natural (material compositional) sciences. To know 
that such causation occurs, we must have explanations that take 
psychological causation to operate in such ways.  (241) 
 
For materialism of any sort to be true, even the most modest claims of 
compositional materialism, the psychological aspects of rationality must be 
explicable in material terms.  This requires that the sort of mind-brain dependence 
posited by materialism also be attributed to psychological causal features and 
structures.  Science, however, offers no reason to think this picture could be right.  
Beyond the lack of scientific evidence for materialism, Burge explicates two 
primary features of psychological propositional thought.  In this task the robust 
nature of rationality is lucidly displayed, and the implausibility of a reduction of 
such mental features to physical terms is made clear. 
5.4 Can materialism ground the causal features of propositional thought? 
Burge’s first concern is about the conceivability of materially composed 
structures grounding the causal powers exhibited in propositional thought.  These 
causal powers are exhibited in deduction and predication.  Deductive inference 
exhibits rational causation by systematically transitioning the reasoner’s thoughts 
from one premise thought to another, ‘incorporating competence with the logical 
structures of the premises’ to lead the reasoner to the ‘thought occurrence that is 
the conclusion’.  Practical reasoning also exhibits a similar causal force in 
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predication.  Burge states, “An individual’s predicating a concept of a perceived 
particular, in a perceptual judgment, is part of the cause of the individual’s 
practical reasoning about how to deal with a particular.” (244)  Propositional 
thought in each form—deduction and prediction—exhibits force that is not the 
force familiar to the sciences.  Burge states, “...it is hard to see how the rational 
aspects of psychological causation can be illuminatingly explained as a material 
composite of the causal operations of putative neural or chemical components of 
the inferential process . . .” (241)  Present scientific theories only account for 
physical causation by the powers latent in material composites (245); physical 
bonds and their powers do not constitute grounds by which logical inference can 
be justified as truth-conducive.
13
  The causal features of the mind are not 
reducible to any terms available to material science; mental structures and their 
causal features are qualitatively distinct from the physical; there is nothing 
inherently logical in physical nature that constitutes the universal validity of the 
syllogism “P > Q. P. Therefore, Q”. 
                                                 
13
 Transformations within the range of physical states (i.e., amongst elements) 
cannot be analogous simpliciter to the relation between physical composites and 
thought.  When hydrogen and oxygen are separate under conditions x, y and z 
they are in the gaseous form.  When combined under conditions x, y and z they 
are of a liquid form.  In any case, so long as they are composites they are material 
and have material effects.  With the greatest contrast of kind, the mind cannot be 
taken to be physical any more than mental formations (i.e., judgments and 
arguments) can be taken to be a distinct novel form emerging out of physical 
relations.  Change in degree or appearance cannot justify an inference to change 
in kind or reality.  For the analogy to be warranted mental capacities, states, and 
events must be conceptually reducible to physical terms.  Physical qualities are 
not mental qualities; atomic motion does not constitute truth-aptness; up and 
down, fast and slow neural firing cannot ground whether my argument is valid or 
invalid. 
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Where materialism seems to have difficulty explaining the abstract nature 
of causal features in thought, it appears to have a similar struggle in justifying the 
human inclination to move from the concrete particular to the abstract universal.  
Scientific theorizing is driven by the promise of a more parsimonious theory.  
What is parsimony but the ability to account for the greatest number of 
phenomena through the least complicated theory?  What is mathematics but the 
attempt to deal with the overwhelming breadth of particulars through abstraction 
and principle—to retreat from the particulars to abstract thought and therein 
search for theories that are applicable within a broad range of particulars?  Here, 
both scientific theorizing and mathematics, insofar as they incorporate inference, 
appear causally structured in ways not explained by material causation.  Why, and 
how, is it that a layman, when challenged, can immediately consult objective 
categories in thought to relate his claim or act in a way that is justifiable before 
the broad range of men in all times and in all cultures?  The human capacity for 
universal abstract thought transcends the particulars presented to us through the 
senses, and doesn’t seem to be content with the particulars of the world.  We want 
to know whether the sun is going to burn forever, or burn out—whether the sun’s 
effect on the earth’s environment is accelerated by humankind’s actions.  We take 
ourselves to be right (even at the subjective level), and take others to be right 
insofar as their thinking accords with our own.  Yet, interpretations of reality vary 
and disagreements persist.  We aim for agreement with others, but the means by 
which agreement is attained is vague.  Are we warranted in thinking we can come 
to agreement with others?  I see the causal features of propositional thought as 
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inextricably linked with issues concerning disagreement and disunity.  If 
materialism is to explain the causal features of thought, in so doing it will need to 
provide an account sufficient to explain disagreement as grounded in material 
structure, composition, states, or events. 
5.5 Can materialism ground the structure of propositional thought? 
            Burge’s second argument is similar to his first.  Is it conceivable that the 
nature of propositional thought and its structure are conceptually relatable to 
material compositional structures? (244)  Matter has structure through interrelated 
physical bonds.  Burge takes this to be common ground.  For compositional 
materialism to have merit there must be conceivable material correlates, or 
structures, or forces, which can account for rational structure.  Physical bonds 
make up the world.  Yet, present science denies that the world is a text and so 
does not have bonds relatable to a text.  (Knowledge of the world is not spoon-fed 
to us, but it requires interpretation and rational inference.)  As such, the rational 
bonds necessary to theorize and systematically involve oneself in interpretation of 
the data are not relatable to physical bonds.  Interestingly, it is Burge’s felt duty to 
science that obliges him to point out the implausibility of such an idea.  To 
consider his approach further consider the following: 
The physical structure of material composites consists in physical 
bonds among the parts. According to modern natural science, there 
is no place in the physical structure of material composites for 
rational, propositional bonds. The structure of propositional 
psychological states and events constitutively includes 
propositional, rational structure. So propositional states and events 
are not material composites.  (245) 
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The ease of this move is sustained by his distinctly robust view of reason.  If there 
is disagreement it will supervene on a rejection of this view of reason; the only 
way in which to disagree is to doubt the distinct nature of "rational, propositional 
bonds" which constitute the structure of thought.  The implications of such an 
objection may also be resisted, but are clear.  To object on these grounds requires 
the assertion that propositional bonds are not distinct and so are constituted by 
their material structure. 
            On this basis, I take Burge's move as appropriate and justified.  To ground 
one's ability to make any assertion one must presuppose that the rational bonds, 
by which we offer reasoning for our judgments, are not materially 
constituted.  Further, if these are not materially constituted it seems apparent that 
the propositional bonds of rationality are not grounded in the material nature of 
reality.  As such, mental structure is sui generis, enabling rational cognition—the 
capacity to obtain the meaning of premises and then infer a meaningful 
conclusion from those premises.  In principle, the physical sciences offer no 
warrant to materialists to think this problem will be resolved by future 
developments in science.  The gap between the mind and the brain is by all 
Burgean reckonings a logical gap.  On the grounds of scientific integrity, 
comported with a conviction of the robustness of propositional thought, it is 
difficult to conceive of any other way to argue for compositional 
materialism.  Hopes to converge mental and physical phenomena seem to rely on 
implausible hopes of what appears inconceivable on all robust accounts of 
rationality.  For Burge, then, the terms of science create an ironic problem for the 
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materialist who calls for scientific consistency and yet cannot reduce the rational 
structure, nor the causal powers of that structure, to something identifiable within 
the physical sciences. 
5.6 Kobes: On Whether it’s Conceivable that Mental Events be Independent 
from their Neural Correlates 
 In “Burge’s Dualism”, printed in The Waning of Materialism, Bernard W. 
Kobes offers an evaluation of Burge’s cumulative approach to the philosophy of 
mind, and so offers a compelling context in which to see the weight of Burge’s 
claims.  Kobes is concerned with conveying “a sense of the depth and 
seriousness” of the elements of Burge’s dualism.  He does this and much more, 
incisively gathering the elements of Burgean dualism into a robust argument 
against dogmatic materialism.  As Kobes argues, Burge’s doctrine of anti-
individualism is immediately relevant in that the phenomena central to its 
concerns appear to exceed the empirical explicans available to the type or token 
materialist.  Anti-individualism exhibits ‘how our natures are determined by 
norms that reach beyond what we as individuals control’ (215).  Indeed, this 
doctrine makes explicit the “external, objective subject matter, to which thinkers 
have independent, causally mediated access” (220).  Thus, it undermines the 
subjective
14
 mental parameters seemingly entailed by a materialistic view of the 
mind. 
                                                 
14
 Here, and elsewhere, I intend that the term ‘subjective’ refer to the individual 
brain.  This refers to the subjectively-constituted parameters entailed by its 
particular position within space and time, and its lack of causal power to enable 
any mental activity reaching beyond those parameters. 
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 Kobes delves deep into the arguments for anti-individualism.  He tightly 
reiterates the diverse Burgean counterfactuals that, by like agents in twin worlds, 
convey differences that supervene entirely on environmental differences, evincing 
no causal dependence on neural differences.  Kobes’s comments are apposite 
here, 
An objective, mind-independent world can be mentally represented 
only if the relevant mental states derive their natures in part from 
the natures of things represented. This derivation of natures is not 
systematically mirrored in the nature of some local neurological or 
functional substrate, nor in patterns of individual or communal use, 
nor in conceptual or linguistic mastery. Instead, there is a 
‘cognitive distance’ between thinker and represented objects, so 
that mental individuation is directly mediated by non-
representational relations between perceiver or thinker and 
represented objects.  (220) 
 
Kobes takes the “cognitive distance phenomena”, made explicit in the doctrine of 
anti-individualism, to exhibit a mental capacity to understand the “natures of 
objective, mind-independent external objects” (222).  There is an argument for 
anti-individualism implicit here: i) mental representation necessitates that ‘mental 
states derive their natures in part from the natures of things represented’, and ii) a 
neurological substrate is not reflective of the derivation of natures inherent in 
mental states.  From this a conclusion can be inferred: iii) the nature of a 
neurological substrate is not sufficient to explain the mental representation of 
‘objective, mind-independent external objects’.  This summarizes Kobes’s 
acceptance of Burgean anti-individualism: there is a ‘cognitive distance’ between 
thought and the objects being represented in thought since the data necessary for 
representation cannot be found in the neurological substrate.  This distance is 
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expressed in the gap between non-representational features of reality and the 
representation of that reality in the mind, and that gap doesn’t appear to be 
materially mediated in any way.  The inference is drawn: “environmental 
differences directly, and not (and not via--hence ‘directly’) the neural differences, 
best explain the differences in individuation of perceptual states” (220).   
The force of anti-individualism doesn’t stop at type materialism.  Kobes 
argues that, though mental states seem to necessarily draw their nature in part 
from ‘objective, mind-independent external objects’, it is ‘implausible to suppose 
that any neural token derives its nature in anything like this way’ since ‘Our most 
basic ways of identifying neural tokens are through the descriptive and 
explanatory practices of neuroscience’ (220).  In affirming Burge’s argument 
against type-identity materialism and systematically applying anti-individualism 
to argue against token-identity materialism, Kobes seems to bring further 
reasonability to the idea that the material sciences may be ill equipped for the task 
of understanding the nature of the mind. 
 Having concluded that both type and token dualism are unsupported by 
present science, as expressed in anti-individualism, Kobes moves on to consider 
how anti-individualism bears on compositional materialism.  He states,  
Compositional materialism seems to escape Burge’s argument 
against token identity, because the same neural complex may 
compose one mental token in the actual world, and a distinct 
mental token in the twin world.  Since composition is not identity, 
a mental event token may derive its nature in part from the natures 
of represented things in the environment, while the neural event 
token that composes it does not. (224)   
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Anti-individualism, then, can be taken to complement compositional materialism.  
However, Kobes notes that the distinctive explanatory power that the notion of 
composition commonly plays in science will dictate the necessary manner in 
which composition explains mental states. (229)  Composition is employed in 
instances wherein the causal necessities at the macro level, of say chemistry or 
biology, are derived from the causal necessities at the atomic level.  Kobes notes 
further that within the present science mental states are often set forth as 
explanantia of phenomena, though scientific necessity has never required mental 
reference to underlying neural events.  If compositional materialism is true, it 
would seem that such need for reference would be obvious.  Further, if 
compositional materialism is true, it is reasonable to require that mental events be 
explicable in the same terms in which other materially-composed phenomena are 
now interpreted and explained. 
 To clarify this point in the debate between compositional materialism and 
dualism, Kobes borrows from C.D. Broad’s hypothetical archangel.15  Kobes 
considers a mathematical archangel having “unbounded logical and mathematical 
abilities” and a complete understanding of the “fundamental physical objects, 
events, fields, laws, and causes over all space and time”; the powers of the 
archangel are unlimited and she is able to quickly consider all factors, draw 
correlations and infer causal relations where they exist (226).  Given these 
powers, if mental events are grounded in (not necessarily predicted, but can be 
naturally explicated by reference to) neural events and so explicable in material 
                                                 
15
  Haldane, J.B.S. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London: Kegan Paul, 1925. 
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terms, the archangel would be able to draw upon this connection to derive an 
intimate knowledge of the mental events since they are materially composed.  
Kobes states, “Compositional materialism is false just in case the archangel would 
have to first recapitulate our interpretive practices and intentional psychology, and 
only then, if at all, seek neural event correlations” (227).   If the archangel must 
be informed of the intentional states apart from what can be derived through 
neural states, this makes compositional materialism dubitable; this conceivable 
ignorance of the psychological would be sufficient to constitute mental events as 
distinct, and so logically prior, in inquiries of mind.
16
 
 Consider Kobes’s example: “Neural event tokens n1 and n2 may sustain 
certain intentional mental events, M1 and M2 respectively, where M1 causes M2, 
but n1 may not appear to the archangel as, in any illuminating sense, the cause of 
n2” (229).  Suppose that the archangel does not see n1 as the sufficient cause of 
n2; perhaps it is that n1 is one cause among many, all taken together as sufficient 
to cause n2.  The other facts, together with n1 constituting the necessary 
conditions for the occurrence of n2, will undoubtedly include environmental 
factors involved in one’s perceptual representation of the world as described in 
anti-individualism.  If this is right, the archangel will not be able to construct a 
causal relation between n1 and n2 without first constructing an account of the 
related intentionality (representation, or rational predication) involved in M1 and 
M2.  If compositional materialism is true the intentional mental event tokens M1 
                                                 
16
 Kobes is more optimistic than Burge about the prospects of compositional 
materialism. 
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and M2 will not only have correlated neural tokens n1 and n2 respectively, but 
will be derivatives of n1 and n2 respectively and fully explicable as such.  Within 
the metaphysical picture offered by Kobes’s archangel it is conceivable that M1 
and M2 are not merely derivatives manifest by the underlying neural correlates.  
The identification of these mental events constitute necessary pre-conditions for 
the archangel’s deriving a causal relation between n1 and n2.  Their identity and 
determinacy, conceived in this picture of scientific inquiry into causation, is 
independent of the materially composed neural network of the human brain (228).  
In offering this thought experiment Kobes seems to have delineated the terms of 
compositional materialism poignantly and evinces the difficulties that might make 
promises for future compositional explications dubitable. 
 Furthermore, I take Kobes’s argument to exploit an oft-neglected point: 
correlation doesn’t constitute causation.  We naturally count our intentional states 
as having causal power, and rightly so it seems.  Present neuroscience, through 
the materialists’ dogmatic interpretation, would have the archangel causally link 
n1 and n2 citing correlation.  Yet, correlation doesn’t offer explanantia for the 
causal features the archangel is seeking to account for the constitutive nature of 
n2 (229).  To count n1 as having explanatory power, or offering promise for 
future explanation, appears to be ad hoc.  In accounting for the intentional causal 
relations of an agent, the archangel cannot end inquiry by referring back to the 
neural level; the “intentional causal relations stand on their own” (229).  For 
Kobes, this constitutes the grounds of Burgean dualism. 
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 Kobes intends this as a thought experiment; it must be noted that the 
conclusion is dependent on the truth-status of the premises.  Yet, it does seem to 
exploit a radical distinction between the manner in which cognitive neuroscience 
attempts to account for all events through the causal powers of matter and the 
plausible need for a more robust causal apparatus to account for the nature of 
thought and its role in intentional causation.  It seems reasonable, then, to think of 
Burgean anti-individualism, and the individuality of the mental expressed through 
Kobes’s archangel, as together constituting a compelling reason to take 
materialism as assertion without argument, and offering no causal explanation.  
Furthermore, this is reason to doubt appeals to neuroscience as argument for even 
the weakest form of materialism (229).  Nagel’s call for wonder resounds even 
here since the empirical sciences seem to offer no conceivable way in which to 
explain rationality. 
5.7 Burge: On Materialism and Its Interpretive Tendencies Against the Real 
Nature of Propositional Thought 
 Burge and Kobes both exhibit a profound respect for science, its 
accomplishments and its explanatory power.  However, Burge (and perhaps 
Kobes) strives to conceive of ways in which the causal powers or structures of 
representational psychology in propositional thought could be understood in terms 
of physical causality or structures.  Given the conclusiveness touted in 
materialistic explanations of mental phenomena, and the great efforts made by 
Burge and Kobes to derive such an explanation, it is a wonder that their respect 
for science doesn’t smoothly lead to materialistic parsimony.   
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One is left to wonder why those who have strongly committed themselves 
to materialism aren’t led in similar ways to doubt materialism’s professed 
scientific basis.  Burgean dualism is constituted by Burge’s own readiness to let 
the intentional realities of human life stand on their own (“Burge’s Dualism”, 
229).  Kobes records Burge’s view of materialism as “a pervasive ideology 
without clear foundation in either compelling a priori metaphysics or in successful 
explanatory practices.” (216)  Burge further executes judgment on this matter in 
his appraisal of Jaegwon Kim’s assumption that the world is ‘fundamentally 
physical’:  
There are many questions to be raised about this idea and how it is 
supposed to apply to various cases (the mathematical ‘world’, the 





Note here that both Burge (and perhaps Kobes) are noting complex products of 
rationality as being realities jeopardizing, perhaps even defeating, the materialistic 
worldview.  These categories of the objective (mathematical conceptualization, 
value-theory, rational justification and argument) are concrete examples of the 
materialists’ lack in foundation, and as such may expose materialism’s lack in 
overall consciousness toward rationality and its logical implications as a theory. 
Positively stated, rationality is the greatest problem for materialism.  The 
objective categories cited by Burge in his resistance to Kim represent the unique 
aspects of a human capacity for logical, objective interaction.  If this capacity is in 
fact objective all claims that ground themselves in subjectivity-bound capacities 
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 See Burge’s Foundations of Mind (2007), 368. 
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will be insufficient.  Hence, a sharper argument emerges if the materialists’ 
subjectivity-binding dogma (theory) can be shown to lack consistency with the 
materialists’ unconscious presupposition of the objective in their claim (practice).   
5.8 Objectivity Considered: Can the materialist relate? 
 I’ll leave rational justification aside for a moment and use value-theory as 
an instantiation of how I understand Burge’s concerns over objectivity, with 
respect to Kim’s claim (i.e., Kim’s claim that the world is ‘fundamentally 
physical’).  There is a prima facie tension between the objectivity of rational 
judgment in value theory and the materialistic inclination to locate such thoughts 
in the brain.  Objectivity in value-theory, then, could instantiate one theoretical 
difficulty for the materialist.  This is an aspect in which the ‘theory is under-
specified’ (to use Burge’s words).   
 Value theory is notorious for heated disagreement because of a propensity 
to instantiate ‘objective principles’ as universally applicable in all particular 
contexts.  Can ideological disagreements be accounted for on a materialistic 
account of the mind?  If so, what will a resolution of such disagreements look 
like?  One suggestion may be that disagreement is grounded in thinking truth to 
be objectively applicable.  If this is right, it may be said that such disagreements 
are avoidable if ideologies are understood as veridical at the subjective level only, 
as entirely relative to an individual community or person. 
 To convey this view consider that Jones claims p: “Abortion is wrong.”  
Some theorists may cite p as obviously subjective, given that experts within the 
relevant field disagree with one another.  In response, it may be affirmed by most 
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that these issues can be explained and resolved through eliminating objectivity in 
ethical claims if such claims are truly grounded in the subjective.  However, to say 
that Jones’s moral claim p is a subjective claim requires that Jones’s reasons for p 
also be subjective.  When Jones seeks warrant for the claim p, then, she will only 
cite subjective factors—factors that are devoid of any objective common ground 
between herself and her opposition.  However, this is not the case.  Jones, like any 
human being does not cite the subjective, but the objective.   
 When we seek to justify ourselves to others, especially to an authority, we 
reference our circumstance in ways that relate the objectivity of our decisions to 
those willing to listen.  We form ideas about the rights of choice or the rights of 
life, the rights to property or the rights to freedom, as truths grounded in the 
nature of those respective persons or things involved.  Could it be the case that 
such conflicts are due to a simple overextension of subjective claims?  If so, then 
why, when challenges arise, is each individual driven to justify his or her claims 
by appealing to reasoning that can be objectively evaluated for coherence and 
strength?  This account seems to track reasons why non-materialists cite value-
theory as an instantiation of the ineluctable nature of objectivity in any claim.  
Consequently, we are left with a difficulty about how a materialist account of 
value-theory might begin apart from appealing to objective categories that 
transcend Kim’s ideal of the fundamentally physical world. 
 The problem for the materialist is very much tied up with the problematic 
aspects of subjectivism that Nagel attacks in The Last Word.  The nature of 
rational judgment naturally (though perhaps unconsciously) inclines us to cite 
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objective reasons available to all reasoners as the reasons for our judgment that p 
is true or false.  Nagel records the subjectivists’ ideology: “Since all justifications 
come to an end with what the people who accept them find acceptable and not in 
need of further justification, no conclusion, it is thought, can claim validity 
beyond the community whose acceptance validates it.” (4)  Nagel addresses this 
subjectivist claim in the following way:  
The essential characteristic of reasoning is its generality.  If I have 
reasons to conclude or to believe or to want or to do something, 
they cannot be reasons just for me—they would have to justify 
anyone else doing the same in my place…But for any claim that 
what is a reason for me is not a reason for someone else to draw 
the same conclusion must be backed up by further reasons, to show 
that this apparent deviation from generality can be accounted for in 
terms that are themselves general…Ideally, the aim is to arrive at 
principles that are universal and exceptionless. (The Last Word, 5)   
 
 Contrary to subjectivism, parameters
18
 don’t disconnect one from 
objective features of reality, but instead tie one to it; such parameters only affirm 
that one’s subjective experience is buried in the particulars of objective reality.  
These parameters may be unique.  Yet, Nagel’s point is so fitting: where one’s 
actions are questioned within a context, one will be required to provide objective 
justification sufficient to show that another would be justified to act similarly 
under similar conditions.  For example, where one’s actions are in question by a 
just court, one may be declared innocent if one provides reasons sufficient to 
warrant one’s actions.  That is, if I my actions are in question I must show that 
another would be justified in doing the same in my place.  In the face of suspicion 
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 By ‘parameters’ I intend to denote the scope of limitations inherent to a subject.  
For example, a material subject or substance will inherently be limited to the 
parameters of time and space in which it inheres. 
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or prosecution, despite all the subjective factors of my unique circumstance, to 
account for another doing the same in my place I will be led to “arrive at 
principles that are universal and exceptionless” that warrant my actions.   
 In this light, perhaps one may better relate to Burge’s expressed doubt that 
materialism can arrive at such principles.  Value-theory is only one instantiation 
of the robust features of rationality that presents a great problem for the 
materialist. 
 Furthermore, one might give more careful attention to the nature of 
rational justification.  No syllogism or inference—philosophical or scientific—
can be formed without some reliance upon objective logical form and universal 
concepts.  If this is right, to give up rational claims, as dependent on one’s ability 
to grasp the objective, would be to give up one’s ability to cite reasons as 
explaining one’s choices.  As Kobes notes, this would be to give up on one’s 
rational deliberation having any point.   
 It seems somewhat obvious at this point that if one is to be a subjectivist 
about the human mind and its claims, in theory or in practice, it is unclear how 
they could consistently participate in human life.  Burge’s resistance to 
materialism on the basis of objectivity (of which value-theory is one token) 
reaffirms my contention that our claims (as beliefs, or mental acts) must be 
grounded in a metaphysic of the mind that coherently affirms the capacity to 
make such claims.  With Burge, I doubt that materialism can offer an account of 
rationality that epistemologically grounds the objectivity of its claims. 
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5.9 Further Consideration of Origins of Objectivity 
 One final note can be made concerning Burge’s most recent work, Origins 
of Objectivity (2010).  One might take him to suggest that a natural, or 
evolutionary, development of the material brain, via material processes, can 
account for the human capacity to “think infinite thoughts” (to use Nagel’s 
phrase).  Burge states, “...animal agency gains a primitive type of objectivity 
when non-representational relations to the environment and pre-representational 
psychological structures yield perception.” (548)  This certainly could be taken to 
be causally relating the origins of perception to the origins of objectivity in the 
human mind.  However, this is inconsistent with what we have already seen 
developed in “Modest Dualism”; a move linking perception and rationality 
through a naturalistic process doesn’t answer how matter, as constitutively local, 
could conceivably yield a capacity for the sort of objectivity involved in 
propositional structures and causality, conceptualization and veridicality.   
 An alternative interpretation is more plausible, taking Burge’s comments 
to be about perceptual objectivity (e.g., acting upon a perceptive certainty that 
there are two lions and not just one) and not conceptual objectivity (e.g., knowing 
that logical integrity precludes contradicting oneself; that any observer can look 
over my shoulder and evaluate whether I am understanding the concept of ‘2’ or 
‘circle’).  Since Burge is speaking of objectivity as grounding the perceptual 
apparatus of other forms of life, one might ask about the distinction between 
humans and the rest of the animal kingdom.  Why is perceptual objectivity not 
sufficient to constitute the propositional attitudes of humans?  A sufficient answer 
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to this question seems to yield an interpretation that rationality, and the sui 
generis objectivity that follows from it, constitutes a form of life that is not 
reducible to a materialistic account of rationality as base intentionality.  I’ll draw 
again on a powerful passage from Burge’s Origins of Objectivity, 
Perception, unsupplemented by propositional thought, cannot 
engage in representation that is functionally independent of a role 
(either an attributive role or a singular applicational role) in 
contextually referring to particulars.  Perception is essentially, at 
every point, context-bound singling-out of particulars. Its 
attributions function in presenting particulars.  (542)   
 
One might add the necessary inference: “...and as such cannot account for the 
origins of rational objectivity”.  Perception and conception are constitutively 
distinct in Burge’s account, and so affirm the distinctive roles in his dualism, 
wherein propositional thought cannot be related to physical bonds or their causal 
features. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A CRITIQUE OF NAGEL’S MONISM 
 To draw back again and see the forest for the trees, reconsider what is 
being asked in the philosophy of mind.  Is the gap between the physical and the 
mental logical or empirical?  As will be seen, neither Nagel nor Burge offer a 
solution with certainty.  Burge’s position has been portrayed as a firm-but-modest 
dualism that sees no room for materialism.  On the basis of the structural and 
causal aspects of rationality, and the entirely distinct notions of present science 
concerning the structure and causal features of the physical world, Burge 
concludes that the two cannot reduce or converge under the terms of our present 
understanding of science.  He states, 
Causation associated with material composites is, to all 
appearances constitutively, not causation that involves rational, 
propositional structure. And it is a principle of physical nature that 
physical structures of material composites are constitutively not 
rational, propositional structures. So it appears that psychological 
causation by propositional states and events is constitutively not 
causation by material composites. And it appears that propositional 
psychological states and events are constitutively not material 
composites.  (246)   
 
Nonetheless, Burge does permit the possibility that the gap is empirical: “Perhaps 
the situation is simply a product of our ignorance” (238), and again, “Perhaps 
developments in empirical science will show how to overcome them” (246).  But 
after making the latter statement, he goes on immediately to say, “But the 
development would have to be fundamental”.  This conveys his contention that 
materialism, as presently held and argued for, is not scientifically supportable.  Its 
support would require what is now counted to be fundamental in science to be 
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uprooted and replaced with something entirely other. This is to say that for 
materialism to be true, a fundamental shift in scientific principles must occur 
beyond any other shift science has known, and nothing less.   
 Though he offers a congenial nod to remain open to a possibility, Burge 
emphasizes his doubts and so reaffirms his dualism,  
In fact, propositional psychological states and events are what they 
are through their having logical forms. None of the primary 
attributes that we cite in theorizing about them--including logical 
forms--are cited as physical structures in the natural sciences. I see 
no clear sense in which propositional psychological states or 
events are physical. (249) 
 
For Burge, no form of materialism presently at hand can stand in the face of the 
present claims to knowledge, whether that is in philosophy, science or common 
sense.  For materialism to be true, given the lucid distinction between material 
and mental qualities, the elemental features of the material sciences would 
undergo destruction.  More specifically, the nature of the terms of science would 
be indistinguishable so as to include that which is now distinguished.  The terms 
of science would be forced to include that which cannot be reduced now; ‘matter’ 
would include that which cannot be empirically sensed, verified or understood. 
 It isn’t perplexing or mysterious that when we come to consider Nagel’s 
ontology we find he is making such an appeal.  Because of his robust view of 
rationality, materialism is precluded without possibility.  His “Psychophysical 
Nexus” could be argued to be a call back to wayward philosophers, who have 
drifted from a conscious affirmation of the delineated conceptual boundaries of 
‘matter’ and ‘mind’.  He aims to bring peace between dualists and materialists.  
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Both do capture very real aspects of the world, and neither position is right in its 
claims to know what is fundamentally real.  The physical and mental as now 
understood are mere aspects, or distinct manifestations, of the real substance that 
lies at the base of reality.  A short review of Nagel’s “Psychophysical Nexus” will 
suffice to capture the essence of Nagel’s solution. 
 In his “Psychophysical Nexus” Nagel affirms the reality of mental events 
as non-physical, and yet affirms a novel form of monism that cannot be defined as 
physical or mental.  His rejection of dualism is based on his theory’s major 
premise: “The inadequacy of those concepts [physical/mental concepts as 
mutually exclusive] is revealed by their incapacity to display a necessary 
connection that obviously must exist” (48). This premise is supported through a 
Kantian distinction between the first-person phenomenological experience of 
consciousness and the third-person experience of physiology and behavior. The 
second premise points out that both physicalism and dualism fail to uphold this 
necessary connection; neither reality can be reduced to the other and both must be 
affirmed as interdependent.  The only way the debate can move forward is by 
postulating the existence of a theoretical substance entirely unknown in the terms 
of our present framework; that is, hypothesize a theoretical substance that realizes 
the fundamental reality that transcends our current limited concepts of “mental” 
and “physical”. 
 Nagel rejects dualism because he believes there to be a necessary 
connection between the physical and the mental.  Nagel states,  
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...this is the main point, while it is obviously not conceptually 
necessary that conscious mental states are tied to specific 
neurophysiological states, I contend that there are such connections 
and that they hold necessarily. They are not conceptual, and they 
are not discoverable a priori, but they are not contingent. They 
belong, in other words, to the category of a posteriori necessary 
truths.  (“Psychophysical Nexus”7) 
 
Nagel’s postulation supervenes on the assumption that this connection is 
necessary.  Rather than seeking to argue for it in a substantial way, Nagel’s article 
builds on Kripkean analogies to make the idea reasonable and then seeks to 
explain how it would work.  However, to Nagel it is admittedly a fact only 
knowable a posteriori by empirical means, and so is yet to be discovered.  For 
now, then, the postulation, though it may be objectively necessary, seems 
contingent to those in the present scientific paradigm. 
 As I see Nagel’s cards, the deck is getting low.  He has embraced a robust 
epistemology and wondered at the objectivity and universality of the thoughts we 
think.  His judgment against materialism has been supported by both Burge’s anti-
individualism and accounts of psychological causation and bonds.  However, 
upon dismissing even the weakest form of materialism, Nagel would have us 
assume a necessary connection between the mind and brain.  Why not embrace 
dualism?  It may be said, “Well, dualism doesn’t affirm the necessary connection 
between the mind and brain”, and such a statement would beg the question.  
Nagel has assumed a necessary connection.  He has not argued for it.  How do we 
know there is a necessary connection between the mind and brain?  Well, it must 
be so, mustn’t it?  No.  I don’t think it must. 
  76 
 Nagel’s appeal is permitted within the present terms of philosophical 
scholarship.  I will argue that it should not be.  My argument supervenes on a 
conviction that tentative appeals to a future science are unwarranted in cases 
where fundamental concepts would have to be abandoned.  There may be 
ambiguity in the use of the term ‘concept’.  By ‘concept’ I’m denoting that 
essence of a thing that the mind grasps, that all members have, that only members 
have, that distinguishes them from non-members.  I will argue that matter and 
mind are fundamental concepts of substance and that no third category is 
theoretically conceivable.   
 Traditional philosophical categories affirm mind and matter as properly 
basic substances by categorizing relevant positions as follows: i) idealism (all is 
mental; no fundamentally distinct physical substance), ii) dualism (both mental 
and physical), or iii) materialism (no fundamentally distinct mental substance; all 
physical).  If this is right, it should be noted that it cannot be the case (by terms of 
sub-contraries: some is matter and some is non-matter) that both mind and matter 
are false substances. 
 It may be argued, however, that this is begging the question and that 
Nagel’s move calls these traditional delineations into question because they are 
not properly basic.  In this view, a Nagelian revolution would be analogous to 
those conceptual revolutions that have brought success to material science in the 
past.  Undoubtedly, in a scientific revolution our previous judgments and 
paradigms come under fire, and often times our concepts are shown to be poorly 
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formed.  Perhaps, in this respect a Nagelian revolution would be like other 
scientific revolutions. 
 However, I contend that Nagel’s approach is not like those already 
contributing to the success of science.  There is no contention in my account with 
the scientific success of postulating theoretical entities as real.  Without Newton 
and others questioning the foundations of their contemporaries, science would 
never have blossomed.  Successful postulations have questioned both religious 
dogmas (i.e., Biblical interpretation against a heliocentric solar system), and 
common sense claims so-called (flat earth).  This critical use of reason toward 
false foundations seems to be a key feature of healthy science. 
 As I noted above, my use of ‘concept’ in this section should be 
distinguished from other common uses.  Specifically, I do not want any ambiguity 
in use of the phrase ‘conceptual revolution’.  No scientific revolution has been a 
‘conceptual’ revolution in the sense about which I’m concerned; no revolution has 
been similar in nature to the ‘conceptual’ revolution Nagel suggests.  Simply 
stated, all scientific revolutions to date have occurred within the scope of what we 
understand as material science.  No scientific revolution has tinkered with the 
fundamental structure of reality and denied that both matter and mind are non-
substances.  Furthermore, on this point, paradigm shifts in science appear to be 
entirely rooted in the questioning of contemporary assumptions about a substance, 
and not about whether such a substance is in fact a substance.  For example, one 
might think of Copernicus’s conceptual genius and see that the genius was in part 
due to his understanding the particulars of a system and the motions of bodies 
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within that system.  From this understanding, he was able to offer a plausible 
alternative that could save the phenomena.  It was not a ‘conceptual revolution’ 
akin to that proposed by Nagel. 
 The successes of science, then, are not founded in any skepticism toward 
the concepts themselves, but about whether those concepts are properly formed or 
fully formed; questioning the appearance of the earth’s shape to get at the material 
reality is not questioning the conceptual framework distinguishing between terms 
(‘flat’ or ‘round’, ‘square’ or ‘circle’) that provide the foundation for thought, 
discussion, and theory.  Even the debate between Cartesian mechanism and 
Newtonian attraction was one in which material processes, however defined, 
were ascribed with the causal explanation.   
 With stark contrast to the plentiful examples of scientific progress, 
Nagel’s postulated ‘substance’ must contain the essential qualities of both that 
which can be empirically sensed (i.e., features of matter and energy) and those 
“mental parts and wholes” that Nagel himself takes as necessary to account for 
“nonspatially defined processes and functions” (“Psychophysical Nexus”, 62).  
The problem, then, is more fundamentally a problem of logical coherence than it 
is of scientific plausibility.  To make his case logically plausible, Nagel needs to 
explain the obvious—how is it that one can logically conceive of a fundamental 
substance that naturally exhibits both spatially defined processes and functions, 
which are inherently empirical (and so empirically detectable), and also exhibits 
the mental qualities necessary to account for the ability to evaluate an argument 
for soundness?  It appears that these categories (empirical and non-empirical, that 
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which is governed by physical law and that which is not) are properly basic.  If 
this is right, Nagel’s postulated ‘psychophysical nexus’ undermines both 
philosophy and science by denying those basic distinctions necessarily maintained 
in order to uphold meaningful thought about substance. 
 Nagel’s suggestion is understandable given his denial of materialism, 
taken together with his commitment to a necessary connection between the 
material brain and the mind.  Though his denial of materialism appears to have 
support, his suggestion that there is a necessary connection between the mind and 
the brain lacks similar status.  This latter postulation is an appeal to an unknown 
that entails an apparently inconceivable natural reality.  It seems more reasonable 
to consider that the connection is contingent, and not necessary.  We have no 
reason to concede and every reason to doubt any such neutral monism (or dual-
aspect theory). 
 Furthermore, though Burge may entertain such philosophical ideas, the 
way in which he defines philosophical modesty doesn’t seem to permit such a 
postulate to endure.  His admonishment against wayward philosophy may be 
helpfully applied here to support the critique of Nagel’s appeal to an unknown.  
Though interrelation between mind and matter is obvious in many ways, there is 
no warrant for inference to a necessary connection.  As such, Nagel’s call for a 
conceptual revolution clashes against Burge’s criterion that all metaphysical 
claims maintain a commitment to science and common sense (233). 
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CHAPTER 7 
COMPLEMENTARITY OF NAGELIAN AND BURGEAN VIEWS OF 
RATIONALITY 
7.1 Agreement Broadly Construed 
 
 Nagel and Burge agree in the broadest sense.  The physical, as presently 
understood in the natural sciences, cannot accommodate the reality of the mental.  
It is in all presently conceivable ways an ontological gap, and not a epistemic gap.  
Rational categories of judgment (i.e., true and false) are “nonspatially defined 
processes and functions” (“Psychophysical Nexus”, 62), and as such do not have 
spatial extension or neuro-scientific verifiability.  A form of life that naturally 
exhibits mental constituents necessary to account for the ability to evaluate an 
argument for soundness cannot be explicable through primary reference to 
spatially-extended compositions or their functions. 
 Rational intentionality conjoins the force of Nagel’s epistemology and 
Burge’s metaphysical dualism.  The material brain and its environment cannot in 
any consistent manner account for rational intentionality, exhibited in mental 
states and events, by reference to type or token neural events.  This is supported in 
Burge's and Kobes's developments of anti-individualistic phenomena, wherein 
they expose type and token materialisms as failing to account for the direct 
relation between one’s mental states and one’s environment.  Yet, as Kobes 
shows, the rational force of anti-individualism against compositional materialism 
remains unclear at best.  Yet, Nagel’s epistemology unveils a deeper strain of 
thought that undergirds robust non-materialistic accounts.  This deeper strain of 
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thought is typified in Burge’s dualism, grounded in the individuation between 
physical types and tokens and their mental correlates, and is fundamentally rooted 
in rational intentionality.   
 Burge’s commitment to a modest dualism also contributes to a deeper 
individuation between perception and conception.  This distinction contributes to 
an even deeper understanding of rational intentionality as constitutively distinct 
from perceptual activities of the brain.  We can consider compositional 
materialism once more in the form of an appraisal of the brain.  We are faced with 
the following question: Can the material composition of the brain conceivably 
account for the robust nature of rational intentionality exhibited in human 
thought? 
7.2 The Brain as Local and its Referential Capacities as ‘Context-Bound’ 
 In Burge’s study of perceptual forms of objectivity he concludes that 
perception is inextricably tied up with perspective, and with the particular.
19
  
Perception, as an act entirely constituted by the brain, is local and so its references 
cannot exceed the context in which they are buried.  Yet, in materialism the brain 
is often alluded to as constituting the natural ground for thought in a hand-waving 
sort of generalization—objectivity in conception is somehow related to, 
supervenient on, and so constituted by, objectivity in perception.  Under such a 
generalization there is no real distinction between base intentionality and rational 
intentionality and so there is no real mystery about the nature of thought. 
                                                 
19
 See subsection 5.1 titled, “On Origins of Objectivity”. 
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 Burge and Nagel are presumably of one mind with materialists in taking 
the brain to enable subjects to perceive and to relate those perceptions.  
Furthermore, there may be a variance in our capacity for perceptual objectivity 
and memory that results in a variety of interests and skills.  I’m thinking now of 
the savant Stephen Wiltshire, who in a recent year spent 45 minutes in flight over 
Rome and thereafter drew the city in all its particular splendor, in uniform 
perspective with a 180 degree view.  Few of us have the capacity for such grand 
tasks, and one would be naïve to deny that the brain is an amazing wonder of the 
natural world.  As such, it is granted that the brain enables sentient beings to 
accomplish grand tasks in all acts of base intentionality.  However, it will need to 




 Burge does not deny that the individual brain’s ability enables objective 
perception according to one’s perspective.  Both he and Nagel will affirm this 
capacity of the brain and the importance of base intentionality in a thinker’s 
interaction with the world.  The brain’s influence is made obvious by damage or 
decay of the brain that adversely affects one’s intellectual powers.  However, 
neither philosopher is satisfied with any naturalistic account reason or the mind 
that would in turn reduce rational intentionality to terms relatable to the physical 
sciences.  There is a robustness in thought as the capacity for the objective—for 
meaning and truth—that is not satisfied by any account that takes such capacity to 
be explainable in terms of a materially-composed object.  
                                                 
20
 See section 5.9, “Further Consideration of Origins of Objectivity”. 
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 Identity theories are bound to what is reflected in the material states of the 
brain.  However, there is environmental influence continually enacted upon one’s 
mental states not immediately reflected in neural states.  Materialists may then 
hope that compositional materialism is prepared to handle this burden.  Yet, even 
as the most plausible form of materialism, compositional materialism is still 
bound to the context of perception, of perspective, and of particulars.  It is one 
thing to perceive correctly, or to be perplexed by the color scheme as it hits a 
prism.  It is entirely another, to abstract from perception the concepts necessary to 
hypothesize and conceive of the circumstances in which the nature of light could 
be better understood (e.g., Newton).  No localized account of the brain can 
account for the capacity to transcend the particulars of numbers and arrive at a 
universally applicable proof that cannot in any way be doubted without doubting 
the fundamentals making up the system (e.g., Euclid).  Though a materially-
composed apparatus (viz. human brain) may be described as a tool relied upon in 
thought, thought cannot be described in the subjective terms necessary to relate 
the capacity (i.e., thought) to its presumed ground (i.e., the brain) without losing 
its essence.  The brain, as essentially local, cannot rationally ground (or even 
warrant) such presumption about the objectivity inherent in human thought.   
 If we are to take ourselves as capable of knowing, or of being able to cite 
good reasons for plausibility, the brain cannot be our metaphysical ground.  There 
is nothing in the physical sciences to sufficiently describe how spatially-defined 
relations between matter and energy in the human brain and in one’s environment 
could enable a human to make an objective judgment and ground warrant for their 
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believing such a judgment to be reliable.  In such a context, all human mental 
representation is perceptual, wholly concerned with the particular and what is 
contextually salient.  Ironically, under this schema even this judgment (that ‘all is 
perception, particular, and pragmatic’) would be unwarranted as an objective 
claim since there is no way for me to transcend my local substance.  All 
references to the objective, even claims about what is practical or what is a 
language-game, cannot exceed or transcend the context or perspective in which 
they are uttered.  The brain is constitutively unable to ground any objective 
rational thought at all.   
 The spatial and temporal locality of the human brain cannot ground a 
claim that there can be no square-circle, or that there is no ‘A’ that is a non-‘A’.  
Nor can it justify my claim that “x is useful to me”, since the claim’s objectivity 
requires that any other in similar circumstance to mine (all things being equal) 
finds it useful as well.  The brain cannot reach this far.  Yet, in any consideration 
of such claims—whether such claims are denied, affirmed, or even questioned 
without any conclusive judgment—one implicitly presupposes that the truth-value 
of the proposition is knowable and that one is a possible knower of such truth.   
 Conclusively, human rational functions cannot be reduced to complex 
sorts of cognitive puzzle-solving, like drawing ants out of a hole with a stick.  In 
an active human mind there are functions occurring that move beyond the 
stimulus of the moment, beyond the variety of motions perceived in the material 
environment.  There are thoughts that transcend the particular and the 
perspectival.  Attempts to grasp the objective are seen in assertions, or judgments.  
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Fundamentally, in distinguishing one concept from another, making judgments, 
and forming arguments, humans manifest a presumption about their ability to 
attain to knowledge about objective states (e.g., whether the mind is material or 
immaterial).  These mental events exhibit the human capacity to evaluate claims 
in light of universally-applicable laws.  If rational intentionality is only a complex 
form of the capacities that are explicable in terms of the material composition of 
the brain, and humans cannot attain to the objective by another means, then 
consistency requires that humans not make judgments or claims, or form 
arguments in support of those claims.  In such a localized framework humans 
would be limited to perception within the immediate spatial and temporal context 
in which one finds oneself.  By inference, if rational intentionality is reducible to 
base intentionality, and all claims are based upon brain capacity, we cannot 
consistently attempt to apply our ideas across space or time.  All is perception and 
desire.  Philosophy and science are impossible.  The particulars can only be seen, 
grasped and felt, and no thing is understood. 
 However, if there is such a thing as rational intentionality distinct from 
capacities explicable in terms of the brain, and humans have this capacity as 
exhibited in mental acts of rationality, then and only then is there consistency in 
making judgments and claims, and forming arguments in support of one’s 
judgments.  Furthermore, this is confirmed amongst every conceivable pillar of 
truth—from a priori disciplines, from empirical science, and from common sense.  
There is no rational support for taking the material brain as necessary or sufficient 
for acts that transcend the realm of perception and of the particular.  Such acts, if 
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they are justified, preclude any theory of the mind that cannot account for the 
capacity of the human mind to move beyond one’s senses and beyond the 
particular.  The objectivity presupposed in any claim, therefore, requires a theory 
of the mind that can ground the capacity for the objective, for rational judgment, 
and for argument. 
7.3 Remarks Concerning Rationality as Grounds for Dualism 
 To this point, the primary concern has been to explicate the positions of 
Burge and Nagel.  In doing so, it has become apparent that both exhibit a similar 
interest in rationality as a means to argue against materialism.  Burge’s case is 
fairly straightforward in his belief that the localized features of the material brain 
offer science no means by which to understand the nature and function of the 
mind seen in propositional thought.  Further, he appears to maintain a distinction 
between perceptual objectivity and conceptual objectivity that nullifies the force 
of materialistic claims to the brain as ontologically prior to the mind.  The 
conviction with which he holds this position is evinced in his stance against 
dogmatic forms of materialism.  Nagel shares this antipathy.  I take Kobes’s 
account to build upon Burge’s arguments, but to further support his position with 
more detail.  Nagel’s lengthy explication in The Last Word provides a robust 
account against skepticism, subjectivism, and naturalism about rationality, and in 
so doing offers reasoning toward the rejection of materialism entirely independent 
of his more work on qualia.  In its own right, his work offers a foundational 
context in which to view Burge’s anti-individualism; the robust Nagelian 
explication of rationality grounds Burge’s claims even more by offering pellucid, 
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concrete applications.  Such applications serve to convey the objectivity of 
rationality, as presupposed by all who think and speak.  Together these recent 
philosophers constitute a formidable ground for a clear argument for dualism that 
doesn’t seem to be easily resolved by materialists. 
 By linking perception and the particular and illuminating a distinction 
between perceptual objectivity and our rational capacity as humans to form 
judgments and arguments, Burge lays a foundation for a unique argument against 
materialism.  Can a purely materialist account offer any ground explicating the 
human capacity to grasp concepts which are not particular?  Further, can such an 
account offer an answer to those who take perception as local and of no relation 
to the capacity of the human mind to attain to the objective?  Burge and Nagel 
seem to be carrying the torch for a countercultural resistance in philosophy that 
doesn’t see any hope for a view of the mind as grounded in the material sciences, 
and further affirms the human capacity to transcend the localized features of the 
brain and of perception. 
 The question is now about the responses of materialism concerning 
rationality.  Do their responses give reason to believe they can answer such an 
argument?  Let’s now consider the appraisals of intentionality by materialists 
Daniel Stoljar, John Searle, and Paul Churchland. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CAN MATERIALISM ACCOUNT FOR RATIONALITY? 
8.1 Materialistic Evaluations of Intentionality 
 
  Burge’s anti-individualism gives great strength to the notion that identity 
theories are false.
21
  Even compositional materialism has a heavy burden with no 
presently conceivable hope of breaking through to an explanation.  Nonetheless, 
disagreement remains, and there are plenty of type and token materialists to keep 
the position alive and well for a generation to come.  Is there a presumptuousness 
amongst these philosophers—an unwillingness to accept the materialists’ 
arguments from science—or are materialists not willing to note and consider the 
arguments against their position? 
 Prior to considering the materialistic approaches to rational intentionality, 
we can sketch the general form of argument that any form of materialism must 
take in attempting to account for rational intentionality.  Premise 1) If there are 
rational phenomena and no immaterial nature or force exists THEN rational 
phenomena are explainable through the material sciences; premise 2) There are 
rational phenomena and no immaterial nature or force exists; THEREFORE, 3) 
rational phenomena are explainable through the material sciences.  It should be 
noted here that the conclusion (3) necessarily entails some sort of naturalistic 
explanation of rational intentionality.  Such explanation would require that 
                                                 
21
  In “Modest Dualism” Burge argues that a type or token neural event, because 
of variant causal histories, can occur even while the mental event with which it is 
to be identified doesn’t.  On this basis, he states, “...the neural event is not 
identical with the original mental event” (234).  This is in agreement with Kobes.  
From here he shifts his focus to consider compositional materialism. 
  89 
rational intentionality be understood as reducible to or supervening on material 
terms or functions, or explainable with reference to material composites.   
 However, there are necessary implications if such an explanation is to be 
taken as true, or plausible. Since materialistic terms abrogate causal features 
inconsistent with the fundamental powers natural to matter, the way in which we 
understand mental states and their causal powers must be consistent with the 
nature of the material in which these mental notions ground themselves; rational 
intentionality must fundamentally fall under the category of that which is 
governed by physical law. 
 The framework of the argument for materialism (above) conveys 
presuppositions about two aspects of human existence.  Materialism: i) explicitly 
affirms the material world as real, and also ii) implicitly affirms rational 
intentionality in thought, speech and, more explicitly here, claim-making.  A 
fundamental tenet of materialism requires that all phenomena be identical to, or 
composed out of, matter.  This would also have to be true of rational intentionality 
and, more specifically, of our claims.  Rational intentionality, then, must be 
explainable with reference to the fundamental powers natural to matter.   As we’ll 
see in the token materialistic arguments offered, to make this work reason must be 
naturalized or minimally made to conform to powers that are essentially 
understood according to physical laws. 
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 In Stoljar’s article Physicalism22 he distinguishes between qualia and 
intentionality, and then goes on to state, “...it is important to note that most 
philosophers don’t consider the issues of intentionality as seriously as the issue of 
qualia when it comes to physicalism . . . As Chalmers notes (1996; p.24),...the 
intentionality issue is a problem, but the qualia issue is a mystery”.  As a result, 
the reader is led to think that intentionality presents no mystery amongst 
philosophers of mind, and so is likely not worthy of further consideration. 
 Of course, for Nagel and Burge, intentionality presents a much greater 
mystery than has been noted by Stoljar.  Nagel wonders at how the finite mind 
could contemplate infinite thoughts (The Last Word, 74), and Burge cites his view 
as having “...appreciation of the deep differences between rational structures and 
physical structures” (“Modest Dualism”, 250).  This mysterious nature of the 
human mind seems to be a very substantial concern to Nagel, Burge and Kobes.  
By contrast, given Stoljar’s treatment, it’s fair to assume that the broader scope of 
philosophical literature treats rationality as relatively basic and unproblematic for 
materialism. 
 Taking what has been said above, the concern is about our concept of 
substance.  Can the presently conceived notion of material substance explain the 
human ability to logically conceive and derive meaning according to an objective 
standard, which is distinct from any particular aspect of the physical world 
including the individual brain?  Further, can the sciences in like manner account 
                                                 
22
  Section 14: “The Case Against Physicalism II: Meaning and Intentionality”, 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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for the human capacity to judge the thoughts of others to see if they satisfy the 
objective standards of reason?  Consider humankind’s ability to derive meaning 
from scientific classification, hypothesis, and success.  How is Newton’s 
discovery—his use of universal concepts including the essence of light and of a 
prism, and his ability to isolate phenomena--to be accounted for and more 
particularly explained in material terms?  Consider our ability to have 
mathematical certainty, to evaluate and believe or deny Euclid’s conclusion.  This 
is not an issue of first-person, subjective perception (i.e., qualia) that exists in 
animals and humans alike.  It is not the mere ability to perceive, but to treat these 
perceptions logically—to interpret one’s experience, make judgments, and form 
arguments in an objectively critical way that arrives at claims about the essential 
way things are from all known perspectives.  For materialism, this ought to be 
recognized as both the mystery and the problem.  Yet, in Stoljar’s survey of 
arguments for dualism, concerns about the objectivity of propositional thought do 
not arise. 
 Second, consider John Searle’s analysis of intentionality,23 
What I want to do...is bring the whole issue down to earth. If you 
ask, how is it possible that anything as ethereal and abstract as a 
thought process can reach out to the sun, to the moon, to Caesar, 
and to the Rubicon, it must seem like a very difficult problem.  But 
if you pose the problem in a much simpler form, How can an 
animal be hungry or thirsty? How can an animal see anything or 
fear anything? Then it seems much easier to fathom. We are 
speaking...of a certain set of biological capacities of the mind . . . 
But in explaining how brain processes can cause feelings of thirst, 
we have already explained how brain processes can cause forms of 
                                                 
23
  For context see chapter titled “Intentionality”, pages 112-135, in Searle’s 
Mind: A Brief Introduction. (2004). 
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intentionality, because thirst is an intentional phenomenon . . . The 
basic forms of consciousness and intentionality are caused by the 
behavior of neurons and are realized in the brain system, that is 
itself composed of neurons. What goes for thirst goes for hunger 
and fear and perception and desire and all the rest.  (Mind, 115) 
 
Searle has not answered Burge’s or Nagel’s concerns.  He’s has only attempted to 
argue for a naturalization of reason—the very operation they’ve considered 
themselves and found to be impossible, perhaps absurd. 
 Consider: for a deer to act it must perceive the scent and, based upon what 
can be identified as neural impulse (which for Searle constitutes the feeling of 
thirst), act to fulfill the biochemical desire represented in, or constituted by, the 
brain state.  This is categorically distinct from my having the logical structure 
allowing me to conceive of numbers, of being and time (universal concepts), and 
of the principles which universally apply to each of these; it does not in any way 
seem reasonable to reduce my conception to a material, neuro-chemical 
complexity.  The difference between perception and conception is a difference in 
kinds of intentionality, as relatable to the distinction between the perceptual 
capacities of the senses in the realm of the particulars and the conceptual 
capacities involved in grasping a concept, or judgment, or argument, and 
evaluating or believing it.  These latter operations, those of conceptual capacities, 
rely on the mind’s capacity for universals. 
 Paul Churchland offers his own materialistic attempt to account for 
rational intentionality, and it is notable in offering an alternative account of 
rational intentionality that does not explicitly reduce this capacity to perception or 
desire: 
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…Consider first our capacity for mathematical reasoning which so 
impressed Descartes.  The last ten years have made available, to 
anyone with fifty dollars to spend, electronic calculators whose 
capacity for mathematical reasoning—the calculational part, at 
least—far surpasses that of any normal human.  The fact is, in the 
centuries since Descartes’ writings, philosophers, logicians, 
mathematicians, and computer scientists have managed to isolate 
the general principles of mathematical reasoning, and electronics 
engineers have created machines that compute in accord with those 
principles.  The result is a hand-held object that would have 
astonished Descartes.  This outcome is impressive not just because 
machines have proved capable of some of the capacities boasted by 
human reason, but because some of those achievements invade 
areas of human reason that past dualistic philosophers have held up 
as forever closed to mere physical devices. 
 Although debate on the matter remains open, Descartes’ 
argument from language use is equally dubious.  The notions of a 
computer language is by now a commonplace…Granted, these 
artificial ‘languages’ are much simpler in structure and content 
than human natural language, but the differences may be 
differences only of degree, and not of kind.  I do not mean to 
suggest that truly conversational computers are just around the 
corner.  We have a great deal yet to learn, and fundamental 
problems yet to solve (mostly having to do with our capacity for 
inductive or theoretical reasoning).  But recent progress here does 
nothing to support the claim that language use must be forever 
impossible for a purely physical system.  On the contrary, such a 
claim now appears rather arbitrary and dogmatic… (15-16) 
 
Churchland’s sentiment here exemplifies the reasonings behind a major 
contemporary push toward artificial intelligence.  This fascination with artificial 
intelligence (though faultless in itself) is often used to argue for an identification 
of intelligence with rationality.  As Churchland’s account of rational intentionality 
shows, the concept of rationality is narrowly defined as essentially a 
computational capability.  Here, reason is reduced to calculation and a description 
of the facts.  Under such a schema, what is important is “what works”.  Reason, as 
such, has no scope beyond a utilitarian function to optimize that which is valued 
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individually or corporately.  Furthermore, for a purely physical system such value 
is in optimizing duration and quality of life for that physical system or network. 
 However, there should be little contention in stating that calculation and 
its resulting practical fruit are not fully satisfying to the rational mind.  
Computation does not ground questions like: “How do I know?”, “What is real?” 
or “What ought I to do?”  The rational mind demands meaning, and is compelled 
to work toward a deeper theoretical understanding of reality as it coherently 
accords with (but is not identical to) the practical aspects of life.  Materialists and 
non-materialists alike continue to aim for a coherent interpretation that 
encompasses all known phenomena.  When coherence in a belief system is 
attained, that understanding is what is fundamentally fulfilling and practicality 
results secondarily as a consequence.  Reason is a transcendent feature of 
humanity, not a calculative function, and as such manifests itself in the desire for 
an objective understanding of reality. 
 By referencing meaning here as a coherent understanding of the reality in 
which we live, I intend to connect with the unique aspect of human thought 
exhibited in grasping concepts, making judgments and forming arguments.  This 
is not reducible to calculative powers or linguistic abilities embedded in a device 
through the efforts of an external mind.  When I speak into a recorder the recorder 
is not speaking of its own accord, as if it has its own thoughts.  A painting is not a 
reflection of the capacities in the medium, but in the artist.  The capacities of a 
calculator don’t exhibit any material capacity to use reason, or to find meaning or 
settle disputes through its use of reason.  Such devices merely evince the human 
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capacity to understand objective principles and coordinate those principles with 
the particulars of matter to bring about a tool that can aid me in my relevant 
purposes.  In this way the calculator is essentially no different in its function than 
a very complex abacus.  The abacus gives a resulting output when I use it 
according to principles of numeration that I understand.  The calculator cannot be 
said to understand the operations any more than the abacus.  A computing system 
(binary or quantum) is not taught to read language.  Instead, they are formed with 
the function to interpret that language, and at most may be programmed to derive 
more complex operations through consistency with given principles.  
Furthermore, computing systems may be formatted in such a way as to become 
more precise in operations over time, through emulation, as if it were learning, but 
again it must be remembered that this process is made to conform to the principles 
understood by the human mind and not by the computer itself.  The function of 
the computer supervenes on the maker’s purpose and not on some putative 
purpose of the functioning apparatus. 
 The result of this consideration shows more clearly that materialistic 
interpretations of rational intentionality must theoretically abrogate it (e.g., 
Searle), or limit it to some capacity that functions in a way related to the base 
intentionality of physical systems (e.g., Churchland).  These attempts at reduction 
do not account for our need for a coherent understanding of the world.  Rational 
intentionality, as has been shown, is that capacity to reach for an understanding of 
reality according to objective principles of thought that are essentially 
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distinguished from all other base forms of orderly behavior, and complex function 
as seen in other sentient beings. 
 To be fair, my distinction between base intentionality and rational 
intentionality is claimed by many to be innate to the functions of other intelligent 
life forms.  It may be asked whether such a distinction can account for 20
th
 
century work with animals and language.  To engage with this concern, consider 
Josep Call and his study on great apes.  The apes may be thought to clearly show 
an ability to conceptualize, judge and even obtain warrant in argument in the form 
of a disjunctive syllogism.  The ape evinces behavior showing perceptual relation 
to a perceived object, and more importantly a complex ability for perceptive 
interaction.  An apple is put into a box, and another box is empty.  The boxes are 
swapped around to cause uncertainty.  One perceiving the ape sees him reaching 
for a box.  This behavior exhibits rational thought, perhaps: “Either the apple is in 
this box or in that box.”  The empty box is handed to the ape.  The ape sees it’s 
empty and then reaches for the other box.  This behavior exhibits apparent 
reasoning: “It’s not in this box.  Therefore it’s in that box.”  One seeing this action 
may take this to be indisputable evidence of the ape performing a disjunctive 
syllogism, reasoning of the form ‘p or q, not q, therefore p’.  Certainly here, it 
would seem, the distinction between perception and action in base intentionality 
comports with higher forms of intentionality, and produces rational mental 
operations. 
 We certainly ought to consider this carefully.  Without much contention it 
could be suggested that, for this sort of exclusion to occur in the purported mind 
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of the ape, the ape must also have a more fundamental ability to conceptually 
identify (and not merely perceptually identify), and furthermore distinguish most 
obvious differences between one form of being and distinctly different forms of 
being.  The ape certainly perceives a distinct object (the apple), that object of its 
desire, and thereby distinguishes it from those objects that are not the object of 
desire.  This seems obvious enough. 
 Furthermore, some contemporary research has contributed to data that 
would call into question whether humans are more perceptually intelligent than 
other primates.  One primary resource is offered in the research completed in 
2007 at the Primate Research Institute at Kyoto University in Japan.  The research 
was documented in an article titled, “Working memory of numerals in 
chimpanzees” (2007) written by Sana Inoue and Tetsuro Matsuzawa.  The test 
was mediated through a computer screen that had randomly positioned numerals.  
The test subject was to touch each number in sequential order as quickly as 
possible.  The most intensive portion of the examination involved white boxes 
masking over the numerals after a short duration of time.  After filtering through 
the less intensive levels of examination, three agents were tested at this more 
intensive level.  These agents included: the most accurate human subject tested, 
the most accurate mother chimp tested (“Ai”), and the most accurate young chimp 
tested (“Ayumu”).  The shortest duration for unmasked numbers to appear was 
210 milliseconds, near the frequency of occurrence of human saccadic eye 
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movement.
24
  At this greater speed subjects are unable to explore the screen 
through eye movement; memory is left to depend on only that information 
obtained by a glance.  In both the adult human and mother chimpanzee, there was 
a significant decrease in success corresponding to the decreased viewing time.  
However, Ayumu’s performance was remarkably consistent, and showed little 
difference despite the variances in viewing time.  Ayumu outperformed the 
human subject in both speed and accuracy.  Inoue and Matsuzawa suggest that 
this data shows good reasons to believe that chimpanzee memory is superior to 
human memory.  There seems little reason to doubt this conclusion given the data. 
 However, having delineated what a disjunctive syllogism would entail in 
mental capacity, and granting the ways in which chimpanzees can exhibit greater 
intelligence in certain capacities, the problem of rationality, quite ironically, 
becomes more difficult.  We know that apes cannot conceptually communicate 
with humans; all ape communication is non-linguistic and pertains to an 
immediate context involving a given perceptual framework.  If chimpanzees (or 
primates more generally) are equal to their human counterparts in tasks of 
memory, and perhaps relatively intelligent overall when compared with humans, 
what is left to explain the notable communicative deficiencies in primates?  If 
intelligence exhibited in perceptual interaction is fundamentally similar between 
primates and humans, what conceivable variables can be understood as impeding 
a chimpanzee’s purported conceptual capacities in conceptual communication 
                                                 
24
 Referenced in the Inoue-Matsuzawa article as follows: Bartz, A.E. (1962). 
“Eye-movement latency, duration, and response time as a function of angular 
displacement”. J. Exp. Psychol. 64, 318–324. 
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with humans?  We are called by the empirical data to reconsider our judgments 
about intelligence.  After numerous attempts over the past four decades to 
assimilate primates into the language community of humans, the attempts have 
been characterized as failures, and even more—disastrous.25  Primates cannot be 
taught principles and thereafter grow in understanding of a subject, to contemplate 
the future or consider death.  The suggestion that non-human beings cannot be 
taught concepts, judgments and arguments is further supported in that all 
objectivity for chimpanzees in communication invariably supervenes on the local 
and perceptual aspects of reality. 
 It’s clear enough that the difference between apes and humans is distinct 
from those differences we find between German and Chinese thinkers.  Members 
of human communities like Germans and Chinese, Aborigines and Europeans, 
exhibit great in intellectual capacities or interests.  Yet, invariably, they share a 
common capacity for understanding concepts, making judgments, and forming 
arguments.  This is most clearly seen in cosmological concerns, or the 
interpretation of one’s experience through basic belief; humans construct and 
change worldviews, animals do not.  Though my dog may lead me out of a 
burning building through behavior communicating a perceived danger, or an ape 
communicate dissatisfaction with some thing within its local environment, this 
does not signify any capacity in the dog or ape to understand concepts or form 
                                                 
25
 Edelstein, David. "'Project Nim': Monkeying Around With A Chimp : NPR." 
NPR : National Public Radio : News & Analysis, World, US, Music & Arts : 
NPR. 7 July 2011. Web. 22 July 2011. 
<http://www.npr.org/2011/07/07/137672140/project-nim-monkeying-around-
with-a-chimp>. 
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judgments.  Instead, these circumstances evince a capacity to communicate in 
non-conceptual forms that merely supervene on the perceptual data in the 
immediate context, and can be explained as such.   
 In stark contrast, communication that is uniquely human transcends 
reference to particulars.  The grasping and communication of a concept like that 
denoted by the word ‘food’, which is common to all thinkers, is not obtained 
because of greater intelligence (via evolution of the brain) or adaptive 
mechanisms for communication; the wonder of conceptual objectivity shared 
among humans—that capacity to transcend the particulars of time and space—is 
not conceivably ascribed to an increase in the quantity or quality of firing patterns 
in the primate’s brain.   
 A hypothesis taking the quantity or quality of firing patterns in the brain as 
accounting for conceptual objectivity would take the distinction between primates 
and humans to be a difference in degree.  If this were the case, the common 
capacity could be bridged through non-verbal means within a short span of time, 
as it is within the scope of human communication.  But there is no such bridge 
between humans, whose understanding and communication enables the perceiver 
to transcend the perceived particulars and grasp the universal concept, and non-
human beings, whose communication exhibits a behavior entirely explainable by 
reference to its perception and desire within the context of its local environment. 
 Compounding this wonder, that I can attain to the objective, is the 
common human nature essentially exhibited in being rational that allows all 
humans together to attain to the objective.  Assuming that the syntax and 
  101 
semantics of my assertion are understood, anyone with normal brain function and 
disciplined focus can critique my compliance or lack of compliance with the rules 
of rationality in most cases.  Nagel states, “To reason is to think systematically in 
ways anyone looking over my shoulder ought to be able to recognize as correct” 
(The Last Word, 5, emphasis mine).  All rational persons presuppose the self-
attesting authority of reason, as exhibited in thought and speech, and it is this very 
capacity which enables, even obligates, one to reach to the objective each time 
they considers a concept or makes a judgment.  This cannot be reduced to the 
same capacity exhibited in the wavering desires of a deer, the behavioral 
intelligence of an ape or the capacities of a computer in calculation that merely 
emulates a very narrow aspect of human rational consciousness. 
 In this way there are reasonable grounds to infer a distinction between the 
perceptual capacity (and resulting communication) common to both apes and 
humans, and that conceptual capacity unique to humans.  The distinction between 
perception and conception, between base intentionality and rational intentionality, 
in every way points to the need for another explanation. 
 The naturalization of reason by means of a conceptual conflation of 
rational intentionality and base intentionality may attempt to maintain the 
complexity of a materialistic conception of rationality, but in the end this 
conflation manifests itself as a diminishment of rationality; rationality is 
conceived of as being no more than a complex function grounded in the 
perceptual capacities of base intentionality.  Overall, the materialistic view 
attempts to affirm the intelligence and obvious perceptual communication in the 
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behavior of non-human animals, but fails to distinguish this intelligence and 
communication from the rational nature and function uniquely exhibited in 
humans. 
8.2 The Epistemological Status of the Claim “Materialism is true” 
 The claim “Materialism is true”, motivating the conflation of rationality to 
desire, perception or computation, is subject to the meaning of its own 
propositional content.  If materialism’s truth-status entails a naturalized view of 
reason, one’s metaphysics is too heavy for such a weakened epistemology to 
support it.  Naturalized reason (as an amalgam of desires, perceptive capacities, or 
computation) is too weak to support this metaphysical view; it cannot justify, 
warrant or support the taking of one’s claim to be any more than what can be 
constitutively understood by reference to the nature of that naturalized capacity.  
The result is that, under a materialistic metaphysics, we cannot obtain warrant in 
any objective claim since, in essence, conceptual objectivity requires that one 
transcend the limits of perception and one’s environment.   
 Objective claims like those of Newton, Euclid, or the common man (in 
judging the sun to be fated to burn out) cannot be construed in terms of desire or 
perception or computation, since as objective claims they transcend the 
limitations of perception in grasping and understanding objective principles that 
govern reality.  If desire and perception fundamentally construe the basis for our 
claims they will direct the proper way in which to understand rational 
intentionality.  A statement “materialism is true”, within this schema, will only 
permit a judgment that one wants (i.e., desire) materialism to be true, or is 
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materially disposed to believe (through computation) materialism to be true, 
where the statement is “the output” or verbal expression exhibiting one’s 
materially-disposed brain state to believe.  Such a claim in any case is devoid of 
any ground for believing ourselves to be capable of objective knowledge.  As 
such, in not offering any epistemic groundwork to support its claims, this schema 
is devoid of any rational force to persuade us to believe it. 
 As a result, all materialistic claims reduce to behavioral manifestations 
that should be described accordingly.  If the propositional structure leading one to 
believe p is materially composed (in the brain), the judgment is trivial.  One 
cannot be said to have good reason for asserting p, but only a commonly-held, or 
mutually agreeable, disposition to believe p to be true.  Materialism entails that 
what the materialist presumes to be grounds for his claim that materialism is true 
(i.e., his reasoning), is merely a process expressing his material disposition to 
believe p through conventionally-coordinated utterances.  Any materialistic 
account will similarly be found inconsistent, and so incoherent, at the 
fundamental level.  The natural outworking of materialism’s fundamental 
commitments, taken together with its implications for rational intentionality, lead 
to the undermining of the grounds necessary for rational functions of thought and 
speech.  That is, a materialism that is consistent in practice with its fundamental 
theory will be self-refuting in its implicit denial (theory) of those principles it 
implicitly affirms to have any thought or speech at all (practice). 
 Nagel and Burge each give distinct reasons why one should avoid 
materialistic claims.  Nagel speaks of the claims we make every day as being such 
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that they are available for rational critique.  We should expect that others looking 
over our shoulder agree with us if our claims are endowed with sufficient rational 
support.  Can the nature of matter, evidenced in the phenomena studied in the 
material sciences, support the objectivity of rational judgment amongst persons?  
As Burge shows, the nature and full extent of perceptual capacities are 
constitutively captured in the application to particulars within the here and now.  
As such, though the behavior of matter may be the same everywhere understood 
and described through universal laws, the nature of materially constituted 
perceptual capacities is essentially local.  More explicitly stated, a sentient being 
taken to be materially constituted would be limited to only those localized 
particulars available through its perceptual capacities; transmission of perceptual 
data to the brain gained through perception of phenomenon x requires that the 
brain be spatially and temporally related to the immediate context wherein 
phenomenon x occurred, perhaps at times supplemented with memory.   
 A resulting limitation of materialism is that references to such phenomena 
cannot be taken to reach beyond the brain’s immediate context.  Consequently, 
the brain, taken as a metaphysical ground for rational intentionality (in 
materialism), cannot rationally warrant claims that exceed one’s immediate 
context.  With Nagel’s explication of reason as that unavoidable inclination to 
attain to objectivity in thought and Burge’s clear delineation of objectivity as 
distinct between the acts of perception and conception, the concept of matter 
appears unable to justify or warrant our disposition to make claims. 
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 To elaborate this point, consider that for a modest materialist claim 
(“Materialism is most plausible”) to obtain as an objective claim it must be 
theoretically grounded in (or undergirded by) an ontological commitment that 
provides a substance sufficient to account for objective claims.  That is, the 
objectivity of my claims must coherently comport with my view of the self.  The 
nature of matter, as that which is governed by physical laws, leaves me with 
nothing to ground the objectivity of a claim that has been derived by rational 
standards.  My view of self, if purely material, will only grant me the warrant to 
make claims in ways that accord with, and are explainable by, reference to the 
nature of matter. 
 If materialism is true and I am expected to believe that materialism is true, 
then agreement with materialism would be construed materially, and not 
rationally, at the fundamental level.  Under this schema, agreement is not the 
result of one’s willingness to evaluate an argument for soundness by the use of 
one’s rational faculties.  The causal features of rational intentionality must be 
fundamentally understood as material features.  More explicitly, the conceptual 
work, the formation of judgments and (more alarmingly) the citing of rational 
support for one’s belief, are in themselves impotent.  Applied to the present 
discussion, one’s belief that materialism is true, or that materialism is false, is 
fundamentally due to one’s brain and its ‘proper’ structure or function.  
Furthermore, the implications for community are grim since there is no hope for 
agreement through the use of reasoning in itself. 
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8.3 Salvaging Mental Objectivity within a Materialistic Framework 
 
  It may be suggested that, in a Turing-style picture of the mind, there is an 
isomorphism between symbolic processing (reason) and the underlying hardware 
state transitions.  Prima facie, this seems to be a very promising line of argument 
for the materialist.  The physical bonds may be mirrored in propositional bonds; 
my understanding of a disjunctive syllogism is a mental mirroring of the nature of 
physical bonds.  In this picture it would be argued that there is no sacrifice of the 
epistemic objectivity inherent to rationality because rationality would be 
reflecting the objectivity inherent to physical bonds.  
 However, I’m concerned about what this might imply about the rational 
evaluation of argument.  To comport rational evaluation with materialism, it 
seems that the materialist must take the semantics of argument as materially 
interacting with the hearer's brain (i.e., the materially-composed thought 
processor).  As such, once the semantics are heard properly the reasonableness of 
the argument is seen and agreement follows.  No problem, right?   
 We need to ask ourselves about the more common reality.  What if all 
semantics involved in an argument are understood and disagreement persists?  For 
the non-materialist, the fault may lie in an unwillingness (i.e., mental disposition 
of the agent) to examine one’s assumptions and beliefs for rational consistency.  
That is, if the disagreement were grounded in a failure of rational bonds (as 
distinct from physical bonds), the disagreement has the possibility of being 
remediated by argument.  For the materialist, however, the explanation is much 
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more difficult since the fault must lie somewhere in the materially composed 
mind of the hearer.   
 If this sort of mirroring is veridical, we would expect that the materially 
composed force constituting the link between material propriety (i.e., in structure 
of function) and knowledge would be sufficient to bring about agreement in all 
cases.  Explanation of the disagreement, and therefore culpability for persisting 
disagreement, could not be rooted in anything other than the structure or function 
of the materially composed minds.  So, if materialism gets it right and such a 
mirroring constitutes the human capacity to make objective claims then, all things 
being equal between materially composed minds, it would follow that in the case 
of any given argument all minds (properly mirroring physical bonds) agree in 
their evaluation of the argument.  Furthermore, both minds would also agree in 
their evaluation with precisely similar reasoning since reasoning is fundamentally 
constituted by and corresponds with one’s brain state, structure or function. 
 However, I contend that this picture is far from accurate.  Many persons 
don’t doubt the data used by evolutionists or misunderstand the meaning of their 
words.  Berkleyan monists don’t doubt Samuel Johnson’s ability to ‘kick a stone’ 
in attempt to refute Berkeley.  Yet, the disagreements persist.  The meaning of the 
arguments (or of the kick) in these cases is entirely understood by the hearer (or 
observer) and so cannot account for the disagreement in any way. 
 In instances of genuine disagreement, then, a natural outworking of 
materialism appears to find fault within variant material dispositions (i.e., 
variances in structure or function).  Consequently, the willingness to consider 
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argument rationally, as a means to know the objective plausibility or truth of a 
claim, is dismissed.  That is, there is nothing inherently valuable in argument that 
compels the hearer, or gives warrant to the hearer, to believe or disbelieve.  Since 
the causal features of reason are fundamentally constituted by the causal features 
of matter the causal force involved in believing a premise to be true, or in 
believing the conclusion of a sound argument, must be ascribed to the semantics 
corresponding with the disposition of the material mind.  Agreement occurs just 
in case a hearer understands the semantics of the argument and is materially 
disposed to agree; that is, agreement occurs within a mind wherein the materially 
composed force innate in the semantic structure of the argument exceeds the 
material resistance of that structure. 
 The only rational justification for discussion that materialism can offer 
then is comprised of a belief that all disagreement is due to a misunderstanding of 
syntax, or misinterpretation of semantics.  However, the longer philosophy goes 
on the more factions arise.  This doesn’t seem to support such an attempt at 
rationally justifying discussion.  Agreement, then, will only come in cases 
wherein material dispositions are alike, and in all such cases discussion is 
mechanistic, not rational; discussion is merely an operation wherein we come to 
discover those with material dispositions similar to ourselves.  It appears that on 
all materialistic accounts discussion is rationally unjustified as a means to come to 
genuine agreement about what is true and of value. 
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8.4 Materialist Implications Derived 
 Similarly here, as in my analysis of materialistic evaluations of rational 
intentionality, material disposition offers no epistemic ground to believe one's 
belief is true.  Within the scope of this schema, sound argument can only be said 
to be sound on grounds of agreement between similarly disposed minds across 
time, and a claim that "Materialism is true” is only a claim that I am materially 
disposed, or "desire" (in psychological terms), to calculate or believe that 
materialism is true.  As such, agreement with the claim 'Materialism is true' 
doesn't entail the truth or rationality of materialism, and it offers no causal force 
that I should regard as giving good reasons for me to believe materialism.  
Further, if I understand the claims of materialism, and I believe I do, my material 
disposition is already manifest.  My continuing to disagree with materialism under 
such conditions reveals that my material disposition is in fact disagreeably 
structured or composed in a manner unlike those who believe materialism.  If this 
is the case, no amount of clarification in argument will bring me into agreement 
with materialists.  Yet, I ought not be disheartened in this disagreement since, 
under the scope of materialism, agreement gets me no closer to the plausibility or 
truth of the proposition. 
 In the natural outworking of materialism’s fundamental commitments 
agreement merely shows that there are at least two minds materially disposed to 
believe similarly.  If the semantics are in place, persisting disagreement amongst 
persons can only be due to the variety of material dispositions and no further 
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appeal to argument will bring agreement.  In the natural outworking of 
materialism, then, it appears that argument is impotent. 
 On these grounds it seems reasonable to think of any attempt to absolve or 
limit rational intentionality to the perceptive or computational capacities exhibited 
in the brain as precluding or undermining all warrant for attempts to attain an 
objective understanding of reality.  As such, any reduction of rational 
intentionality to physical function will essentially undermine one’s ability to make 
any objective claim.  Thus, materialism itself would undermine its adherents’ 
attempts to proclaim its truth. 
8.5 Against Materialistic Dogmatism 
In “Modest Dualism”, Burge devotes the final paragraph to considering 
how it is that philosophers like Stoljar, Searle and Churchland persist in their 
position.  He recounts his earlier days in the field, “Many philosophers exuded a 
certainty that was out of line with the speculativeness and lack of force in the 
grounds supporting their positions. Many still do.” (250)  The idea conveyed here 
is that materialism remains a prominent position because dogmatic philosophers 
cling to their own preconceived ideologies rather than yielding to positions better 
supported by science and common sense. 
Burge’s stance is grounded in his view of science, and he posits that 
current material science offers no promise for explaining the mental through 
reference to the brain and its physical environment.  The nature of “propositional 
states and events” can be clearly seen to ground themselves in their logical forms 
and causal powers and these are not materially constituted.  Burge states, “And 
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there are attributions of reason in parts of psychology that have no analog in the 
natural sciences.  Material composition is not a relation that grounds theorizing in 
mathematics or logic” (235).  So, materialists are without warrant in taking the 
psychology of propositional attitudes as attributable to the physical structures 
presently identified in natural science (249).   
For those who follow the Burgean/Nagelian countercultural ripple, it 
seems ironic that cognitive science is currently thought of as being able to lead us 
to a more comprehensive naturalistic account of the mind.  It would seem that the 
same candor would prevail in anyone with a genuine love of the sciences, 
entailing an affirmative stance on the limitations of data.  In turn, this candor 
would culminate in a common belief that no number of empirical studies can 
explain rational structure and its causal efficacy through the material.  Yet, this is 
not the case and so the conflict continues on the basis of what appears to be in 
many ways an ad hoc fallacy.
26
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 My claim that materialism is ad hoc may require reiteration here: My 
opposition to materialism is grounded in rational intentionality, and this in turn is 
grounded in the nature of inquiry.  By beginning with inquiry, I’ve shown that 
materialism is from the outset precluded by a robust view of rationality.  
Consequently, I take any attempt to justify materialism as due to an unwarranted 
neglect of epistemic priorities.  Furthermore, I take materialism to be grounded in 
ad hoc fallacies when its use of the concept matter is weakly defined and not 
identified with any delineated essential qualities.  Where the concept is treated as 
forever open to revision, one’s metaphysics can never be called into question in 
self-examination or be made open to philosophical examination.  Discussions 
with materialists may turn out to be similar to the following: if x is a phenomenon 
then x can be understood by reference to matter because, after all, all is matter.  
For further development of this point, see section 9.2 “Self-Examination: Has this 
argument for dualism committed an intensional fallacy?”. 
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 If rational intentionality cannot be coherently integrated or conceived of 
properly within a materialist framework, then the existence of rational 
intentionality warrants, even requires, the rejection of materialism.  Materialism 
requires that all aspects of existence (including reason) be construed in terms of 
that which is governed by physical law.  Furthermore, reasoning and belief, if 
governed by physical law, cannot coalesce with offering, or having, good reason 
for belief since physical law cannot be used to offer reasons for belief distinct 
from its conforming to a physical form or function.  Furthermore, Burge has 
explicated the nature of propositional psychological states and events in a way 
that evinces the lack of support from reason or science to take such states or 
events as conceptually related to physical structures or bonds. (“Modest 
Dualism”, 241, 244-246) 
 If the natural outworking of materialism leads to the impotence of valid or 
sound argument, the natural outworking of materialism will require that we take 
ourselves as believing out of desire or disposition (something like natural 
functions of physical systems or computation) and only cite such phenomena as 
the underlying components of belief.  It has been shown that the natural 
outworking of materialism leads to the impotence of argument, since argument 
presupposes an ability to transcend the aspects of the particular and obtain 
objective reasons for believing one proposition over its contradiction.  For this 
reason, I’ve concluded that a materialist must take valid argument for x as 
impotent in rationally persuading others to believe x.  Belief or disbelief of the 
theorems of Euclid or Newton is not fundamentally constituted by the causal 
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features of rationality, but by the causal features of matter.  The argument given is 
explanatorily irrelevant when looking for the causes of disagreement between 
reasoners.  Reason is not what allows any person to look over my shoulder and 
evaluate my reasoning.  Matter is.  If one is a materialist a genuine, conscious 
appraisal of this belief’s implications will obligate one to have greater consistency 
with that belief and forego attempts to gain warrant or justification for one’s 
belief through the use of reason and argument. 
 In my proof for dualism, I’m assuming the truth of what has been said in 
section 7 against Nagelian sorts of appeal to mysterianism as a means to maintain 
belief in neutral monism.  The promises made by such positions rely on an appeal 
to ignorance (“we may know in the future”), and assume an empiricism that offers 
no clearly delineated definition for ‘matter’.  If rational intentionality is veridical, 
and neither materialism nor Nagelian monism can account for i) the essential 
quality of matter as a fundamental substance and ii) the reality of rational 
intentionality in the human mind, then another position is logically necessary.  
Dualism is logically necessary to uphold our presupposed ability to think and 
speak about the objective and universal. 
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CHAPTER 9 
BRINGING THE STRANDS TOGETHER 
9.1 The Central Anti-Materialist Argument  
 Harking back to Nagel, rationality is an objective capacity that transcends 
all particulars of the brain and one’s physical environment in space-time.  Nagel 
states, “To reason is to think systematically in ways anyone looking over my 
shoulder ought to be able to recognize as correct.” (5)  Furthermore, Nagel and 
Burge together have given good reason to deny an over-extension of naturalistic 
explanation.  Consider Nagel’s relevant thoughts again: “...overuse of 
evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about 
the human mind” (131).  In the midst of a culture laden with naturalistic 
explanations, Burge has clearly exposited fundamental features of science (e.g., 
nature of physical bonds and their causal features) to expose the nakedness of 
material monism.  As a result there is little, if any, reason to see materialism as 
being supported in any way by current science.  Hence, extension of material 
functions into mental ontology is an overextension, and so unwarranted.
27
  A 
scientific distinction is therefore necessary, delineating a clear distinction between 
structure and causal features of propositional thought and those structures and 
causal features of matter.   
                                                 
27
 Tightly reiterated, the argument (from section 8.2 above) is as follows: i) If 
mental features are fundamentally material features then there is no objective 
thought; ii) There is objective thought; iii) Therefore, mental features are not 
fundamentally material features. 
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In addition to the elements I’ve borrowed from Nagel and Burge, I’ve 
argued further that the natural outworking of materialism, understood in light of 
its most essential commitment (all is matter), logically entails the impotence of 
argument. 
 Argument is not impotent.  Both materialists and non-materialists value 
argument.  Consistent with this value, we do not inquire into the nature of the 
mind based on material standards for the appraisal of matter, but on rational 
standards.  We do not take our rational agreements or disagreements to be due to 
the material structure or function of our minds; when we seek to criticize, 
persuade, and justify through the use of reason, we do not simply point to 
materially construed rational bonds.  We want good reason for believing what we 
do, not good matter.  One who is concerned with integrity in belief will require 
this of oneself and of others.   
 A norm of rationality is satisfied when we have good reasoning behind our 
belief.  This norm is exhibited in our attempt to reference the objective in our 
reasoning and explanation.  I take myself as believing that white light is 
composed of light of various wavelengths because Newton offers good reasons to 
believe this claim; I take myself to believe Euclid because I take myself to 
understand the objective, though non-empirical, nature of numbers, and he offers 
sound reasons on that objective basis that there is no limit to the sequence of 
prime numbers.  (Note the wonder of being able to capture this understanding for 
ourselves, given the expanse of time and space that separates us from Euclid!)   
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 Furthermore, applied to the discussion of mind, I take myself as 
disbelieving materialism because I believe there is good reason to believe an 
alternative position is a better representation of the truth.  Materialists do not 
ordinarily take themselves as believing dualism to be false because of the material 
structure or composition of their brains and its environment.  Each of us, 
materialists and non-materialists alike, take ourselves as believing what we do 
because we have good reason to believe what we do.  All things being equal, 
where we are concerned with integrity, we evaluate arguments based on their 
conformity to the universal standards of rationality and we treat persons as 
responsible for recognizing a valid argument as valid because they are capable, as 
rational agents, to evaluate such arguments.  Our rational attitudes are logically 
and pragmatically incompatible with materialism, being grounded in the valuing 
of rationality as function that is independent of physical desires and material 
dispositions.  To be consistent with taking ourselves to be rational, to value 
thought, to be consistent in treating discussion as a means to understanding and 
agreement, requires that we embrace a dualistic interpretation of the mind.  
9.2 Self-examination: Has this argument for dualism committed an 
intensional fallacy? 
 Opponents of dualism may object to this reasoning, judging it to be 
committing the intensional fallacy.
 28
  An intensional fallacy differentiates entities 
by referencing a variance in mental attitudes towards a thing.  In committing this 
                                                 
28
 Neutral monism is held in common by neutral identity theories of material 
monism and dual-aspect theories.  What is said here undermines the common 
assumptions of both. 
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fallacy one disregards real, objective mind-independent commonalities or 
distinctions existing in the relations between external objects.  One example of 
argument close to the heart of analytic philosophers that commits this fallacy 
would be similar in content to the following argument: i) ‘The medieval peasant 
wants water; ii) the medieval peasant does not want H2O; iii) therefore, water and 
H2O are not the same substance’.  Ignorance should be corrected.  The natural 
kind that is the substance commonly denoted in English with “water” is the same 
substance (referent) as that which has a chemical makeup of 2 hydrogen 
molecules and 1 oxygen molecule fused together; the substance is the same 
though its intensions vary by context.  The mental attitude of the medieval peasant 
has no bearing on the nature or ontological state of an objective, mind-
independent external object. 
 It’s necessary, then, to evaluate the relationship between substance and 
qualities.  I take qualities as inhering in substance, the substance being that being 
which binds qualities together in unity.  In recognizing an essentially distinct 
quality, one is rationally obligated to distinguish that thing or class of things from 
unlike things.  Two substances are said to be distinct in essence from one another 
when they can be shown to differ at the level of fundamental properties, exhibited 
in distinctly dissimilar qualities. 
 The intensional fallacy is committed subtly in cases where there are 
deficiencies in one’s understanding of the fundamental properties of a thing.  In 
the case of water and H2O the intensional fallacy is obvious.  Once one comes to 
understand the fundamental properties of H2O as being the same as those of water 
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one gains a fuller understanding of the nature of water.  Water, as formerly 
understood by the peasant, was a less-fully formed concept.  Notice that the 
peasant’s empirical judgments about water are maintained but that these 
fundamental properties are understood in greater degree as the concept becomes 
more robust.  Learning of the chemical composition of water added to the former 
concept, providing a robust understanding of the said substance.   
 We can note, then, that a referent may be denoted by two distinct words 
(i.e., intensions), but the nature of the referent (i.e., the objective extension 
referred to) may in fact be one and the same; the referent of each word may be 
essentially the same thing.  However, the intensional fallacy is committed when a 
concept is insufficiently formed and a premature judgment is made (e.g., water is 
not H2O, Hesperus is not Phosphorous).  When the concept is less formed one is 
more vulnerable to committing an intensional fallacy wherein an improper 
judgment is made about whether particular qualities inhere in a given substance.  
This is clearly the case in the peasant’s unsound judgment. 
 Within the history of analytic philosophy this fallacy was at the fore of 
J.J.C. Smart’s argument for materialism on grounds of parsimony.  In his article 
“Sensations and Brain Processes”, Smart considers eight dualist objections, each 
of them committing an intensional fallacy.  Our primary purpose in considering 
Smart’s work will be to better understand the intensional fallacy as it relates to 
claims within the philosophy of mind and to see if it is relevant to my own 
position. 
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 Smart aptly notes that each objection assumes that a percipient is 
warranted in taking the meaning or entity as it appears to them under their current 
knowledge paradigm (uncritically held assumption), despite weightier reasoning 
showing the reality to be different from its ordinary interpretation.  Although the 
specifics of each dualistic objection seem to vary in rhetoric, the application 
seems to be the same wherein Smart shows his position to be intuitively adequate 
in taking sensations and brain processes to be physical.  That is, sensations and 
brain processes are not distinct at the fundamental level--at least not distinct 
enough to warrant a claim prima facie that sensations are something over and 
above the physical.  As such, dualistic appeals to sensations as non-physical 
phenomena are prima facie taken to be committing the intensional fallacy. 
 To evaluate my suggested distinction between sensation and rational, 
consider the first objection referred to by Smart:  
Any illiterate peasant can talk perfectly well about his after-
images, or how things look or feel to him, or about his aches and 
pains, and yet he may know nothing whatever about 
neurophysiology. A man may, like Aristotle, believe that the brain 
is an organ for cooling the body without any impairment of his 
ability to make true statements about his sensations. Hence the 
things we are talking about when we describe our sensations 
cannot be processes in the brain. 
 
Smart responds by offering two analogies.  First, he uses the example of Hesperus 
and Phosphorous as the morning star and evening star wherein the two names 
(i.e., grounded in distinct time slices) have one referent (viz. Venus).  However, 
Smart confesses the identity he’s aiming for may require a more palpable 
example.  For this example he chooses to invoke lightning and an electrical 
  120 
discharge.  This is clearly the strong ‘is’ of identity; lightning just is a kind of 
electrical discharge due to ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere.  The 
objector takes a lack of knowledge (e.g., about neurophysiology or about the 
brain’s function) to constitute a real distinction in the referent.  As with the 
peasant’s simplistic concept of water, lightning could similarly be thought of 
simplistically--that phenomenon when light flashes from the sky in a storm.  
However, this is not getting at the nature of lightning but only reporting the 
personal sensation.  Smart’s comments elsewhere speak of the “ordinary man” as 
reporting experience that “something is going on” with no attempt to explain 
“what sort of thing is going on”. (65)  Namely, we do not ordinarily attempt to 
describe in our language what sort of thing is going on materially or otherwise in 
our experience.  However, science does attempt to get beyond the appearance of 
the physical thing and understand the underlying reality that persists throughout 
the variant perceived behaviors of the thing.  Hence, we come to understand that 
lightning is a kind of electrical discharge.  The latter notion of electrical 
discharge of sort x is inclusive but more robust (and so better suited for scientific 
precision) than the former notion of lightning.  What has been said above of water 
holds true here for lightning.  Smart is right to correct such dualistic notions for 
relying on such fallacious reasoning. 
 Furthermore, Smart goes on in his first reply to make a distinction 
between lightning as the publicly observable object and one’s individual sense 
datum of lightning.  My sense datum of lightning is not lightning, but a correlate 
of it.  This relates in the following way: If I have an after-image of my experience 
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of lightning I am able to recount the lightning through memory, but this 
introspective act is not itself relevant to discussing the external objective referent-
-lightning.  The sensation, in this way, is not the activity of the objective referent.  
The sensation is a brain state correlated with the perception of the objective 
referent.  The referent is one and the same, although the brain state may vary. 
 Similarly, I may have an introspective element of experience that occurs 
as the aggregative correlate of my total conscious experiences.  However, as 
Hume noted, this aggregate doesn’t itself get me to an immediate proof for the 
existence of the self but instead to a bundle of mental images.
29
  My perception of 
water, of lightning, or of my self is correlated with the experience of objective 
referents.  I cannot therefore take myself as having self-evident knowledge that an 
immaterial substance exists independently of my brain simply because I have a 
sensation that would commonly lead me to believe such a proposition; the 
objective referent is not immediately known by sensation, or intuition. 
 If dualists are arguing on the basis of experience—and it is clear that many 
are—Smart’s basic approach seems to be perfectly reasonable in arguing for 
materialism.  His approach seems to be: show that dualists, by invoking 
counterfactuals and possible-worlds, are committing an intensional fallacy and 
that materialism follows on the grounds of parsimony. 
                                                 
29
 Recall William James’s dealings with the Associationists.  The immediate 
experience of after-images may not constitute the grounds for the existence of a 
distinct mental substance.  As Hume noted, “All I see when I look inside is a 
bundle of mental images”.  However, inferentially it can be asked of Hume, 
“What is doing the looking when “I” look inside?” 
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 However, Smart’s objections cannot be said to obtain in cases wherein the 
fundamental properties essential to matter are unequivocally defined as those 
properties of substance governed by physical laws.  If rational intentionality 
naturally exhibits qualities distinct from all such unequivocally defined 
fundamental features of matter, as analogous to non-water substance with respect 
to our unequivocal concept of water, there is no philosophical bifurcation open to 
the materialist.  In such a case, the nature of that substance constituted by rational 
properties must be taken logically as being fundamentally distinct from material 
substance. 
 A materialist may evaluate my argument as follows: i) propositional 
thought is governed by rational norms; ii) neurological events/processes are not 
governed by rational norms; iii) therefore, propositional thoughts are not 
neurological events.  This argument would appear to commit the intensional 
fallacy given that both propositional thoughts and neurological processes could 
capture distinct aspects of brain activity--respectively noted, subjective and 
objective aspects of the brain.  However, this materialistic appraisal neglects 
important features of my argument given in section 9.1 (viz. the rational capacity 
to transcend the particular, the perceived, the localized perspectival context-bound 
reference).  Furthermore, an intentional fallacy can only reside where the 
constituent concepts can be conceived of as being commensurably synthesized in 
the nature of an entity and its properties.  In such a case there is reasonable hope 
that the intentional fallacy can be exposed empirically by showing how 
hierarchically (i.e., more basic and less basic) arranged properties can coexist 
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within an entity.  However, where there is a claim that the natures of the 
substances are fundamentally distinct the dispute is genuine.  This is the case in 
my claim wherein the domains of thought and matter are mutually exclusive, and 
so delineated by the laws that govern them.  Norms of objectivity in rationality 
are not compatible with any material monism since such a position would require 
that the potency of argument be fundamentally explained by reference to causal-
explanatory patterns (i.e., physical laws) of physical science.  In such a case the 
concepts are mutually exclusive, and logically incommensurable.  As such, the 
case I’ve presented leaves no conceivable room for hope to resolve the dispute 
between those qualities of being exhibited in rational intentionality and 
materialistic notions of thought.  Therefore, this argument does not commit the 
intensional fallacy.  
 An unwillingness to make inferences by use of good and necessary 
consequence is often buttressed with a claim that an intensional fallacy has been 
committed.  This move is unwarranted in cases where two distinct objective, 
mind-independent external substances exhibit essentially distinct qualities at a 
fundamental level.  If rational intentionality is affirmed, how is it that one can 
logically [in present or future] conceive of a form of being [a single substance] 
that naturally exhibits qualities governed by physical laws and also the mental 
aspects necessary to account for the ability to evaluate an argument for 
soundness?  As argued in section 6, against Nagel’s appeal to monism, it seems 
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necessary that these categories (that which is governed by physical law and that 
which is governed by laws of rationality) be understood as properly basic.
30
 
 Although differences in nature, or essence, may be more or less obvious, 
one’s understanding and life may often depend upon one’s willingness to 
investigate and then affirm the unique, objective natures of distinct substances.  
For example, consider the distinction between water and sarin.  It would be 
absurd (perhaps murderous), given the essential qualities of sarin 
([(CH3)2CHO]CH3P(O)F) if I were to convince you that the two substances are 
the same merely by those immediately perceivable qualities, viz their commonly 
held colorless and odorless qualities.  Although the two distinct substances share 
these qualities, these qualities are less basic.  It’s conceivably the case that the 
distinct phenomena, water and sarin, are one and the same substance, exhibiting 
various qualities under variant circumstances.  The two substances can only be 
understood as essentially distinct (i.e., not one substance merely conditionally 
variant in quality) by understanding the distinct natures exhibited at the 
fundamental level.  Scientifically, we identify two distinct substances qua distinct 
by isolating them and subjecting them to similar conditions.  We then observe 
their behavior to see if, under those similar conditions, the substances consistently 
manifest distinct incommensurable qualities.  We are then able to identify whether 
there be any consistent manifestation of distinct qualities between the two 
substances under similar conditions.  If so, we take ourselves as having isolated 
two essentially distinct material composites. 
                                                 
30
 For further elaboration, see section 6, “A Critique of Nagel’s Monism”. 
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 It would be disastrous in most cases to treat sarin as one treats water.  Yet, 
to get at this essential distinction mankind has been pressed to get a fundamental 
understanding of the substances.  Similarly, in all areas of knowledge, to 
understand the constitutive properties of essentially distinct things one must get at 
the fundamental qualities of the thing (i.e., the nature of the thing).  One must 
understand qualities of water before determining whether another substance 
would fundamentally differ from it.  Coincidently, this is what science is about.  
This is the greatest virtue of the proverbial scientific method and its many forms 
that have brought empirical science to the fore of western society.  So why, given 
such success, do we in the philosophy of mind permit speculation and non-
committal approaches with respect to the nature of matter?   
 Any genuine skepticism about the nature of water would prove 
burdensome to the natural sciences.  If there were skepticism about the nature of 
water, we could not have any basis to empirically define it as distinct from other 
similar substances.  Would we not also have to say the same of a genuine 
skepticism about the nature of matter?  If we do not know what the nature of 
matter is, we have no beginning point at which to distinguish it from any other 
purportedly existing substances; that is, there is no basis for philosophical 
discussion between materialists and dualists without an agreement on the 
fundamental qualities of matter.  If no essential qualities are identified in a 
substance, then no qualities can be understood to contradict such a substance.  If 
matter’s explanatory powers are limitless there is no reason to go on in 
philosophical discussion.  If matter is not limitless in explanatory power, we have 
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an established foundation for philosophizing about the mind.  If philosophers and 
scientists will together commit to a commonly held concept of matter then, and 
only then, can profitable philosophy be done.  Only then can those fundamental 
properties of matter be evaluated by all for commensurability or 
incommensurability with the fundamental properties of constitutively mental 
phenomena of rational intentionality. 
 Ironically, the distinct qualities exhibited in water compared with those of 
sarin (a matter of biological life or death) could be said to be negligible, or less 
immediate, when compared to the differences in essence between mental 
substance, as exhibited in the real aspects of rationality, and material substance as 
exhibited in composition, states or events.  As noted above
31
, if we attempt to 
include the nature of reason under the scope of that which is governed by physical 
law a grave suppression of truth results.  If reason is governed by physical laws 
the implications for our everyday thought and speech—our wanting good reason 
for our beliefs—are fatal.  If materialism is true, discussion and argument are 
absurd.  If one is to consistently maintain a valuing of reasoning (in thought, 
speech and discussion), the substance that constitutes the nature of rationality 
must be held as clearly and constitutively distinct from all physical substance and 
processes. 
 The tension here between materialism and our everyday valuing of 
rationality is ultimate and unresolvable.  If we value reason and (more relevantly 
                                                 
31
 See subsection 8.3 titled, “Salvaging mental objectivity within a materialistic 
framework”. 
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here) argument, we have no good reason to believe materialism to be true, or even 
plausible.  Furthermore, if we want to be consistent in seeking to have good 
reason for our going on as thinking agents then we ought to abandon materialism, 
because our active consciousness as reasoning beings (practice) undermines 
materialism (theory). 
9.3 A More Definitive Modest Dualism 
The search for a metaphysical ground sufficient to enable rational inquiry 
about the mind has led here.  In contrast to the presumptive emphasis on matter, I 
began using an alternative approach [of substance dualism] as a hypothetical, 
beginning with what must be true given our ability to inquire about mind with the 
mental apparatus provided in rationality. The result is an emphasis on the need for 
our claims (as beliefs, or mental acts) to be grounded in a metaphysic of the mind 
that coherently affirms the capacity to make such claims.  I’ve contended that this 
approach dismisses all rational grounds for belief in materialism, and further 
constitutes more robust grounds upon which to delineate terms for a modest 
dualism grounded in rational intentionality. 
Materialism and monism have been dismissed with good reason based 
upon philosophically grounded conceptual distinctions between the constitutions 
of ‘matter’ and ‘mental’, and furthermore materialism and monism are taken as 
scientifically unsupportable within the current conceptual framework.  The result: 
both the physical and mental are to be metaphysically affirmed.  I agree with 
William James.  Properties (or capacities) must inhere in a substance and that 
substance must explanatorily ground the nature of such properties.  Material 
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properties inhere in substance that is definitively defined as that which is 
governed by physical laws.  Rational capacities, not being governed by physical 
laws, are distinct from material capacities and cannot be explained with reference 
to matter.  Therefore, if one’s philosophy of mind affirms rational properties and 
their qualities (taking ourselves in practice to have good reason for any belief) one 
must also affirm that such properties inhere in a substance that can ground the 
nature of such properties.  We could not conceive of localized features of human 
perception apart from that structured substance (the brain) which metaphysically 
constitutes the means by which perception is accomplished.  Similarly, rational 
intentionality (as a mental capacity) cannot be conceived of properly apart from 
that structured substance which metaphysically constitutes the means by which 
humans attain to objectivity in thought. 
 It appears that good and necessary consequence entails an immaterial 
substance as that metaphysical ground for qualities of the human mind that 
transcend the particulars of reality.  That is, the robust nature of rational 
intentionality entails the conceivability, and furthermore the necessity, for an 
immaterial metaphysical ground in human nature that constitutes the means by 
which we attain objectivity in our thoughts. 
9.4 Qualifications for this Modest Substance Dualism: Substance and 
Dependence 
 Herein the term “substance” is used broadly and is not intended to denote 
those aspects often attributed to Cartesian dualism.  The term minimally conveys 
the concept of an immaterial body in which immaterial qualities of being inhere.  
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The phrase "substance dualism" denotes an anthropology asserting the existence 
of two substances.  Yet, the immaterial substance asserted is often taken to be a 
sort of "ectoplasm" or "spiritual gunk" that connote a pseudo-material substance.  
In contrast, the substance dualism posited herein is one entirely predicated on the 
notion of humankind's capacity for rationality and objectivity through the use of 
the mind.  The metaphysical product of this project does attempt to reach any 
further than what seems to be reasonably inferred from the necessary conditions 
for the objectivity of rational intentionality.   
 Understandably, there are questions about dependence remaining.  
However, it is a fairly uncontroversial claim to say that ‘dependence’ is an 
ambiguous term.  There are obvious sorts of functional dependence between the 
mind and the brain that cannot be denied.  Substance dualism affirms interrelated 
dependence between the mind and the brain.  However, substance dualism affirms 
the ontological independence of the mind as constituting the ground for 
rationality.  In the latter affirmation, all notions of existential dependence, that 
would give ontological priority to the brain, are precluded. 
 Functional dependence is evident in cases of brain damage, which reveal 
the interrelation between the mind and brain.  However, such cases are curiously 
taken by many to evince the mind’s ontologically posterior status with respect to 
the brain.  However, data evincing more obvious sorts of interrelation-like 
dependence (like aphasia) cannot be used to warrant less obvious claims about 
ontological dependence.  It may be the case that proper brain function is a 
necessary condition for optimal rational capacities, but that does not show that 
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proper brain function is, in itself, sufficient for optimal rational capacities.  
Interrelation between two substances doesn't imply identity.   
 It may be believed that dualists have no valid, interesting interpretation of 
aphasia.  However, this is simply not the case.  Functional dependence is granted 
by most, including substance dualists.  To account for such dependence one need 
only affirm that the brain is the means by which the mind interacts with the world.  
Naturally, the mind cannot bypass the brain and interact with the world in some 
other way.  So, if the brain is damaged the mind’s ability to interact with the brain 
and its environment will be affected identically.  However, this evinces nothing 
(emphatically!) about the mind’s capacity in itself, ability being distinct from 
capacity.  Hence, a distinction between mental ability, as functionally dependent 
on the health of the brain, and mental capacity, as that rational and unique aspect 
of personhood, delineates a clear dualistic explanation of brain damage cases.   
 On the basis of this explanation, irrespective of one’s metaphysical view 
of the mind and one’s judgment of this explanation, one ought to see that in cases 
of brain damage, or of counterfactual split-brain experiments, all empirical 
conditions will appear similar whether the mind and brain are identical or 
substantively distinct.  Both materialism and dualism, as beliefs formed prior to 
interpretation of the data, direct the interpretation of the data and so cannot be 
argued for through the data.  Any inference from the data about the nature of the 
mind can be questioned by questioning the presuppositions that are used to 
interpret the data.   
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 Consequently, cases of brain damage cannot be used to argue against 
substance dualism.  Though the materialist explanation does attempt to account 
for the evidence, and seems to do so in many regards, alternative interpretations 
of such cases are available that both affirm rational intentionality and dependence.  
So, one is not prima facie logically bound to accept a necessary dependence of the 
mind on the brain.  Materialistic claims that espouse cases of brain damage as 
logically entailing a necessary mind-brain dependence, and the ontological 
priority of the brain, are unwarranted. 
 Furthermore, one may concede with my argument to this point and yet 
deny the idea of mental substance as an independently existing entity.  My reply 
is to grant this.  However, in arguing this point, one might attempt to argue that 
one’s position is more plausible than a position taking the mind as continuing to 
exist apart from the body.  There are likely materialistic assumptions and 
tendencies interwoven into this thinking.  Instead, I contend that a proper view 
would treat the brain as that substance which grants the immaterial mind access to 
the material world.  As mentioned above, this functional dependence is 
illuminated by cases wherein the brain has deficiencies in its function—the 
natural connection between the mind and the brain is diminished.  But such 
functional dependence does not entail an ontological dependence.  Therefore, no 
inference from functional dependence to ontological dependence is warranted. 
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9.5 Rational Intentionality Applied: Traditional Objections to Substance 
Dualism 
 In "Giving Dualism Its Due" Lycan cites 9 objections to substance 
dualism.  Lycan comforts the dualist by affirming that there are just as many 
objections set against any philosophically interesting position.  However, it is 
conceivable that dualism might be held in contempt for its immaterial 
explanations.  In such cases it would be expected that warrant be established 
through point-by-point defeater-defeaters.  However, the case I have presented 
attempts to approach objections in a way similar to Burge’s approach to 
epiphenomenalism; Burge cites epiphenomenalism as an unwarranted worry due 
to misplaced epistemic priorities.  In this, Burge implicitly suggests that the 
philosophical strength of a position ought to be evaluated by appeal to well-
ordered priorities. (223)  For the one who affirms rational intentionality, the 
objective, veridical nature of thought is logically prior to the evidence cited in 
material science, which is inherently limited to the empirical study of the 
localized material brain.  The result: epiphenomenalism, and all other objections 
to dualism that attempt to dogmatically understand rational intentionality through 
the lens of unwarranted materialistic assumptions, constitutes no warrant for 
dismissing a dualism that is epistemologically grounded in the reality of rational 
intentionality exhibited in all thought.  The robust conception of rationality that 
has been purported here precludes belief in materialism, and so perhaps, if noted 
by materialists, would be conducive to a less dogmatic, more transparent and 
perhaps more truth-conducive, debate. 
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 I want to more clearly convey the philosophical strength of this position 
by considering a few ordinary objections to dualism.  Lycan states, (Note: I take 
his reference to Cartesian dualism to be relevant to all forms of substance 
dualism.) 
1) The Interaction Problem of course.  (2) Cartesian egos are 
excrescences, queer and obscure, and they are not needed for the 
explanation of any publicly known fact.  (3) Even if conceptually 
intelligible, Cartesian interaction violates known laws of physics, 
particularly the conservation of matter-energy [Cornman 1978: 
274]. (4) Evolutionary theory embarrasses dualism, since we have 
no idea how natural selection could have produced Cartesian egos; 
an immaterial substance could not possibly be adaptive . . . Paul 
Churchland too has rehearsed objections (1)-(4) 91984: 18-21], 
and…he appeals to simplicity…(5) In comparison to neuroscience, 
dualism is explanatorily impotent (pp. 18-19).  (…The point 
is…that the dualist theory itself explains nothing.) 
 
 In response to Lycan: (1) Interaction is a question, not an objection.  The 
only force it would hold as an objection is grounded in materialistic assumptions 
already shown to be without warrant and self-refuting; (2) Rationality is publicly 
known, even necessarily presupposed for any thought to occur, and yet it is not 
explainable through material terms.  I don’t think the mind, as that which grounds 
this capacity for meaning, is ‘queer and obscure’ unless a materialistic view of 
science is dogmatically assumed without question; (3) The law of the 
conservation of energy pertains to a physical system and says nothing about the 
actions of non-physical entities external to that physical system.  Entropy doesn’t 
entail the nonexistence of substance outside of the physical system of reality.  
Lycan’s claim only assumes what it attempts to prove: all is matter.  This is 
obviously going to affect one’s interpretation of entropy, though entropy itself 
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can still be affirmed in all its essence by a substance dualist.  A substance dualist 
is fully capable of affirming entropy in theory and practice. (4)  Evolutionary 
theory, or natural selection, cannot explain rationality.  In essence, it cannot 
explain objectivity.  So, if one is to have objectivity, it is evolutionary theory that 
is an embarrassment.  It’s entailed in this response that natural selection cannot 
produce immaterial substance or its capacity for rationality, and I’m glad to see 
that Lycan affirms this.  However, this is to the detriment of naturalism, not 
rationality or of that dualism which metaphysically grounds rationality. (5)  
Neuroscience is a study of material processes, and is not materialistic.  It is not 
contrary to dualism.  Churchland’s presumptuous approach is exposed in setting 
neuroscience against dualism, as if they were contrary to one another.  This is 
only further confirmation of the general materialistic attitude that Burge noted as 
dogmatic.  In contrast, one should notice that neuroscience, as the gathering of 
data, explains nothing; the world is not a text.  The data of neuroscience must be 
interpreted, and it is only that interpretation that can disprove or disagree with 
dualism.  The strength of the interpretation will depend on how well founded the 
beliefs are that are used to interpret the evidence.  Neuroscientists coming to the 
table with materialistic assumptions will inevitably attempt (perhaps 
unconsciously) to bring that data under the domain of their prior metaphysical 
commitments, but dualism is unscathed if materialism is unwarranted.  
Furthermore, no materialistic assumption contributes to the explanatory power of 
the neural data.  All data would similarly contribute under a dualist-based science.  
(Beginning with a materialistic worldview and affirming one’s own interpretation 
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as the only interpretation, is a good way of ensuring that one’s science is 
‘explanatorily powerful’.) 
 The dualist position, as the ground for objective thought, is alone sufficient 
to coherently account for the mental capacity for explanation; in one sense, 
dualism is the only position that grounds the capacity for explanation.  It grounds 
our presumed warrant to make objective claims—to do science.  No materialistic 
approach except compositional materialism would seem to metaphysically ground 
our capacity for representation (anti-individualism).  Yet, compositional 
materialism, as the weakest conceivable materialism, cannot offer any 
metaphysical ground for our presumed capacity to think and speak, as particularly 
exhibited in objectivity and argument.  A materialistic view of the mind, then, 
may be an indicator for an unwarranted naturalistic view of reason.  When we 
reform our view of epistemology, as I take Nagel and Burge to be doing, we are 
confronted with rational intentionality as that capacity to make objective claims 
and cannot be naturalized.  We are confronted with an insurmountable authority 
in thought that must be presupposed in order to have any thought at all.  
Consistency with this robust epistemology requires a firmer commitment to our 
view of the mind than is typically the case.  We must affirm a view of the mind 
that can ground our epistemology.  Not just any will do, and even compositional 
materialism fails in this.  In deed, dualism does explain ‘something’.  On the 
grounds of rationality and science, we are led to dualism almost by necessity. 
 Though the nature of this dualism could be left open in some regards, most 
objections to substance dualism appear to rely on a strong assumption of 
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materialism.  With materialism’s logical instability, substance dualism appears 
much more plausible than is often assumed. 
The substance dualism I have argued for places priority on epistemic 
questions; one cannot question reason's authority without implicitly affirming its 
authority.  We don’t want our assumptions leading us astray into some dogmatic 
slumber by overlooking the basic questions about rational intentionality.  I have 
argued that rational intentionality must be affirmed or that objectivity must be 
abandoned.  In emphasizing the priority of epistemic priorities this approach to 
substance dualism easily dismisses all common objections that rely on 
materialistic presumption. 
One's stance concerning materialism is predicated by one’s epistemology.  
For one considering the robust objective nature of rationality any objections 
against dualism seem to wane in the midst of an epistemological stronghold that 
seems to logically preclude materialistic notions of the mind; from this 
interpretive framework all objections seem to be issues of unimaginative 
dogmatism which incessantly appeal to a priority of the physical and empirical 
cognitive studies.  If Burge’s notions of materialistic dogma are right, it ought to 
be expected that many objections will supervene on a presumption about 
interpretation; the metaphysical position of materialism will attempt to take the 
name of science and so dismiss opposition by appeal to its own interpretation over 
emphases on rational discourse.  In contrast to materialistic objections that 
emphasize the particular and the subjective, the success of a meaningful 
philosophical position might be evaluated by its ability to account for all 
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phenomena including notions of objectivity and rationality.  On these grounds, 
materialism has been dismissed and dualism embraced. 
10.6 Anticipating Future Developments 
I am persuaded by Burge and Nagel (inter alia) to think that materialism 
tends toward scientism and, as such, is harmful to the scientific and philosophical 
enterprises.  It oppresses inquiry that would question assumptions by the critical 
use of reason.  Instead, it assumes an unconsciously held sacrosanct epistemology 
(i.e., empiricism; science as ultimate authority) and metaphysic (i.e., naturalism), 
and goes on to use these in the interpretation of (what it takes to be raw) data.  I 
believe this occurs through a confusion of the respective roles of philosophy and 
science.  In presuming a material view of the mind to be true, materialism has 
distracted the scientific enterprise with loaded questions infused with the wrong 
aim.  Philosophical inquiry has been taken presumptively to begin with the terms 
of matter, held up by the central pillar of materialism—there are no immaterial 
substances or forces.  Scientific inquiry has presumably been endowed with the 
capacity to transcend the particular and give us the brute facts.  Yet, there are no 
brute facts and knowledge in science requires proper interpretation.  A proper 
interpretation of the data, however, requires a proper approach, and a proper 
approach presupposes proper basic beliefs.  Basic beliefs are the content of 
philosophy and not of science.  Philosophy is the rightful tutor of those preparing 
for future inquiries into the deeper reaches of philosophy and of science.  It is in 
philosophy that basic beliefs can be questioned and properly established.   
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 Given this correction, I would contend that dualism has the potential to 
burgeon research in both philosophy and science in ways unimaginable under the 
scope of the current schema.  This flourishing of philosophy and science seems 
inevitable, and should be looked forward to with anticipation.  Assumption is by 
nature unkind to rationality.  Its interpretation is taken to be the raw data, and a 
question of that interpretation is ‘irrational’.  Burgeoning of new ideas is 
inevitable when dogmatism loses hold in a culture.  Reason’s wonders sprout 
forth. 
Dualism is philosophically grounded.  It is not scientifically grounded.  
What can be seen from philosophy (that is, what can be seen from an explication 
of those unquestionable principles which enable any inquiry at all) is that 
something like dualism must be true.  Science has no role in this.  Yet, once this 
distinct view of the mind is philosophically established, unwarranted assumptions 
about the nature of science and philosophy are exposed.  Philosophy establishes 
the nature of the mind that coherently accounts for the capacity to do science.  It 
gives us the principles that will enable a consistent interpretation of the data, to 
prevent wayward science (and so ensure greater efficiency in distribution of 
research grants).   
I want to be clear here that I share an intrigue with materialists about the 
progress of empirical studies of the brain.  I might add that I take myself to be 
fairly influenced by the materialistic paradigm (my mental pores still exude the 
imaginative limitations of materialism), and so I may have lost some of the 
imaginative vigor that would lead to the truly intriguing questions for a generation 
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under this paradigm.  Standard objections to dualism seem to be a great resource 
for discovering interesting topics for scientific research.  How does interactionism 
play out?  In the process of evaluating an argument where does the empirical data 
stop, and the mental interaction of rationality begin?  What does a dualistic 
approach to neuroscience entail for the relationship between harmful addictions of 
the brain and the mental weaknesses that fail to consider arguments for more 
beneficial, more valuable, choices?  These are a few interesting questions for the 
scientist under a dualistic paradigm.   
10.7 A Recapitulation of the Epistemic Strength of this Approach to 
Substance Dualism 
 It has been contended that dualism has support on the basis of an often-
neglected view of reason.  Proponents of this view of reason have a propensity to 
accept immaterial views of mind.  Further, materialistic reviews of dualistic 
arguments fail to account for this particular vein of argument.  I began tracing out 
this vein of argumentation with William James who inferred a concrete 
immaterial mind on the basis of the rational capacity to “compound” basic 
concepts.  Next, I offered Plantinga’s and Reppert’s arguments as together 
arguing against naturalistic interpretations of the mind.  Both offer compelling 
reasons to think that value of truth-apt capacities require an immaterial view of 
the mind.  Further, I offered an extensive review of Nagel’s and Burge’s 
philosophies of mind, each in their own right offering compelling reasons to reject 
materialism as a consistent implication of science.  In turn, each offer good reason 
to suspect some form of immaterialism about mind to be true. 
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 Additionally, I infer from Burge’s rejection of epiphenominalism good 
reason to believe the mental as explanatorily prior to the brain in metaphysical 
inquiries into the mind.  What constitutes the mental?  I believe this leads to the 
epistemic status of reason as a self-attesting authority in thought, and this in turn 
leads to the logical priority of the mental (as grounded and constituted in 
rationality) over the physical (no-self attesting authority relevant to thought).  If 
this is right, that the mental is logically prior to the material brain in philosophical 
enquiry, then rationality will ground the metaphysical status of the mind; if 
rationality is not materially reducible, but instead logically prior to it, it is sui 
generis and its qualities require a substance which itself is logically prior to the 
material brain. 
 Finally, building from Kobes’s ideas I offered an argument that 
materialism, consistently held, leads to the devaluing of all argument.  I take this 
fundamentally to be an argument that materialism is inconsistent with rationality, 
since rationality, being objective, veridical and self-attesting, cannot be materially 
construed in any way.  It is materially inexplicable and Nagel’s question, “How is 
it possible for finite beings like us to think infinite thoughts?” (The Last Word, 
74), is apropos for this point.  This constitutes further reason to think of the 
mental as logically prior to, not referenced through, and so entirely ontologically 
distinct from material composites.  Such mental qualities exhibited in rationality 
appear to require a substance that is itself explanatorily prior matter in inquiries 
into mind; epistemic priority appears to necessitate an immaterial substance.  It 
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seems most reasonable, then, to think of rationality as inhering in, and so being 
metaphysically grounded by, an immaterial substance.  
 Upon careful analysis of the grounds for inquiry, a genuine evaluation of 
rational intentionality appears to entail a rationally compelling argument for 
substance dualism. 
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